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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:
:

v.

:

RICHARD NORRIS,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 20000698-SC

Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18(a)- l(2)(e) (1997),
allowing the State to appeal an order of the trial court granting a pretrial motion to suppress when
upon petition for review the appellate court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(b) (1996), allowing this Court jurisdiction over matters certified
by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
First Issue: Is the search warrant at issue in this case unconstitutionally over broad?
Standard of Review: A specific standard of review for a search warrant that is overly
broad has not been announced by the Utah appellate courts. Therefore, the Appellee cites a
federal standard.
A district court's finding that a search warrant was over broad, "is subject to de novo
review on appeal." United States v. Learv. 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988).
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Second Issue: If the search warrant is not over broad, does the affidavit in support of the
search warrant establish sufficient probable cause as to each of the items listed in the extensive
list of articles sought by the search warrant?
Standard of Review: The appropriate standard of review applied to a magistrate's finding
of probable cause is:
In reviewing the magistrate's finding of probable cause to support a search
warrant based on an affidavit, we will find the warrant invalid only if the
magistrate, given the totality of the circumstances, lacked a "substantial basis" for
determining that probable cause existed. In conducting this review, we will
consider the search warrant affidavit in "'its entirety and in a common sense
fashion'" and give "great deference" to the magistrate's decision. The affidavit
must support the magistrate's decision that there is a "fair probability" that
evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant.
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993) (citations and footnote omitted).
Third Issue: Will the good faith exception articulated in U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104
S.Ct. 3405 (1984), redeem a search warrant that is constitutionally over broad on its face?
Standard of Review: The question of an officer's good faith reliance is subject to a de
novo determination by the appellate court. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991)
(citation omitted).
Fourth Issue: Does a similar good faith exception recognized under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution exist under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution?
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court erred in it's conclusion that no good faith
exception is recognized under the Utah Constitution, "is a question of law which we review for
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correctness, according no deference to the trial court's determination." State v. Contrel 886 P.2d
107, 111 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Relevant Statute
The following relevant statute is included in Addendum E:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9 (1999)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 26, 1998 Richard Norris was charged with multiple counts of communication
fraud pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1953). R. 1-8.
After being bound over for trial by a magistrate, Mr. Norris filed a motion to suppress
evidence based on an unconstitutionally over broad search warrant on March 26, 2000. R. 207.
On March 31 the motion was granted and the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant was
suppressed. R. 291-302.

3

On April 12 the State then filed a motion to reconsider, raising new arguments in
opposition to suppression of the evidence. R. 306-20. After a hearing and consideration of the
written memoranda, the trial judge reaffirmed his earlier decision and ordered that the evidence
seized pursuant to the unconstitutional search warrant be suppressed. R. 365-69; R, 384-89.
The State then petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for permission to bring an
interlocutory appeal. The petition was granted and eventually certified to the Utah Supreme
Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 1,1997, Ronald Barton, a Special Agent for the Utah Attorney General's
Office, Consumer Rights Division appeared before a magistrate in the Third District Court
seeking a search warrant. R. 264-90 (Addenda A and B). In support of his petition for a search
warrant Agent Barton executed a twenty-one page affidavit and presented it for magistrate's
review. R. 264-86.
The magistrate issued a search warrant that authorized the search of Mr. Norris' home
and place of business and the seizure of items listed in an attachment, Exhibit "A." R. 287-90
(Addendum A). Exhibit "A" sets out seven different paragraphs each with an exhaustive list of
items encompassing almost any document that could be found in a modern business. R. 287-88
(Addendum A).
The search warrant was subsequently served and nearly every document and electronic
media were seized from both Mr. Norris' home and his place of business. R. 240-63 (Addendum
C).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The search warrant in this case is unconstitutionally over broad. The search warrant
authorizes the seizure of items listed in an exhaustive list that encompasses nearly any document
or electronic media likely to be found in a modern business. The overbreadth of the warrant fails
to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
or Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the search warrant was
unconstitutionally overbroad and any evidence seized should be suppressed.
Additionally, the affidavit submitted to the magistrate was insufficient to establish
probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant. A common sense review of the
affidavit reveals serious problems such as conclusory statements that provide no reliable
information on which a magistrate could base a finding of probable cause, statements wholly
lacking any indication of where the information came from and what the basis of knowledge is
and statements based on stale information. After reviewing the affidavit and considering the
totality of the circumstances, it is clear the magistrate lacked a substantial basis to determine that
probable cause existed to support even a narrowly tailored search warrant.
In order to obtain an all records search warrant, the affidavit in support of the warrant
must show an extraordinary level of corruption. It must demonstrate that all aspects of a business
and a persons private life are so entwined with criminal activity that a seizure of all records,
business and private, is a necessity. However, it is not clear that the issuance of an all records
search warrant meets Utah's constitutional standards. If this doctrine is recognized here in Utah,
it would require that the magistrate make a specific probable cause determination, based on the
affidavit, that all aspects of a business were so pervaded with fraud that an all records search
5

warrant was necessary. The affidavit in this case falls far short of establishing that all aspects of
Mr. Norris' personal life and business were so saturated with fraudulent activity that an all
records search warrant of his home and his business was necessary.
If the warrant is constitutionally inadequate, the Leon good faith exception will not
redeem the warrant. The Leon good faith exception does not apply in situations involving over
broad warrants that an executing officer could not reasonably rely on. Even if the Leon exception
applied under a Fourth Amendment analysis of this case, no such exception exits under Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Given the fatal constitutional deficiencies of the affidavit and the over breadth of the
warrant, the trial judge was correct in suppressing all evidence seized by virtue of the search
warrant in this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE SEARCH WARRANT IN THIS CASE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVER
BROAD ON ITS FACE.
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14

of the Utah Constitution require that a search warrant, "particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 14.
The Supreme Court has recognized that, "there are grave dangers inherent in executing a
warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person's papers . . . [responsible officials,
including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that
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minimizes unwarranted intrusions on privacy." Andresen v. Maryland. 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. 11,
96 S. Ct. 2737, 2749 n. 11 (1976).
The search warrant in this case is overbroad on it's face and fails to minimize
unwarranted intrusions on privacy. Therefore, the search warrant is unconstitutional under both
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.
A.

The language of the search warrant is overly broad, therefore, it violates the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants, "particularly describ[e] the place to

be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. This particularity
requirement prohibits a "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Furthermore,
"[t]his portion of the amendment is essentially a proscription against general warrants whereby
administrative officers determine what is and what is not to be seized. The decision to seize must
be judicial, as opposed to administrative, and the warrant must be sufficiently particular to guide
the officer to the thing intended to be seized, thereby minimizing the danger of unwarranted
invasions of privacy." State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985).
"'A description is sufficiently particular when it enables the searcher to reasonably
ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized.'" U.S. v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750,
752 (10th Cir. 1982) (quoting U.S. v. Wuagneux. 683 F.2d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 1982)).
In this case, the search warrant authorizes seizure of,
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Documents relating to the business activities of RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS
and EMILIO CORTEZ, operating as MAXTRON CORP. (formerly ALTA
PUBLISHING), SANTOS INTERNATIONAL, and UNITED INVESTORS
CREDIT SERVICES, INC.
These documents and computer files are more fully described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto.
R. 289-90 (Addendum A). The attached exhibit then sets out seven extremely broad categories of
documents that encompass almost any document that could conceivably be found in a business
establishment. R. 287-88 (Addendum A). The State claims that this exhaustive list set out in
Exhibit "A" satisfies the particularity requirement. However, the Fourth Amendment requires
more than simply listing every document that might be found in a modern office. U.S. v. Learv,
846 F.2d 592, 602 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
In Voss v. Bergsgaard, the Tenth Circuit explained:
The fourth amendment requires that a search warrant describe the things to be
seized with sufficient particularity to prevent a "general, exploratory rummaging
in a person's belongings. This requirement " 'makes general searches ...
impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant.'"
774 F.2d 402, 404-05 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (quoting, Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 476
(U.S. 1971) and Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 at 512 (U.S. 1965)).
An examination of the Exhibit "A" reveals just how broad and all encompassing the
descriptions given there are.
Paragraph A
Records in whatever form of contacts with customers and clients of MAXTRON
CORP (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING); SANTOS INTERNATIONAL; and
UNITED CREDIT, INC., including mailings, receipt of funds, and inquires.
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R. 288 (Addendum A).
This paragraph, "when viewed in conjunction with the extremely broad authority
described hereafter, it is clear that the cumulative is just too great." R. 297-98 (Addendum D,
trial judge's ruling on motion to suppress).
This paragraph paints a very broad stroke. It allows the seizure of virtually any document
relating to customers of any of the listed businesses. However, this paragraph fails to limit the
search by stating a specific time period relevant to business records that should be seized. In Re:
Grand Jury Proceeding, 716 F.2d 493, 498-99 (8th Cir. 1983) (warrant seeking the seizure of
records of a business from 1976 to 1983 was held to be an invalid general warrant as the alleged
crime took place only in the later part of that time period).
In Leary, the court observed,
the government's argument that the warrant was "as specific as the circumstances
and the nature of the activity under investigation permit" is untenable. Agent
Juhasz' affidavit in support of the warrant was very specific, alleging the
attempted illegal export of a specific product to the People's Republic of China
via a series of specific companies in Hong Kong. Yet none of this information
was reflected in the warrant. The warrant could have been limited to
documents related to the Micro-tel transaction, to the companies suspected of
participating in the illegal export, to the countries involved in the route of the
export... or to a specific period of time coincident to the suspect transaction.
Yet the government choose to include none of these limiting factors.
846 F.2d at 604 (emphasis added). Likewise, this paragraph fails to limit the seizure of
documents related to specific customers listed in paragraph four of the supporting affidavit or as
mentioned above a specific period of time coincident to the suspect transactions. R. 285.
Although the government had information available to it to limit the scope of the search, like the
case above, they chose not to include these limiting factors in the search warrant.
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Paragraph B
Banking records, accounting records, check registers, deposit slips, money order
receipts, receipts for cashiers checks, cashiers checks, records of wire transfers in
whatever form showing the source and application of funds received from or
transferred to persons and/or entities.
R. 288 (Addendum A).
Checkbooks cancelled checks, telephone records, calendars, diaries, and word processors
are no more likely to be related to a defendant's fraudulent business than to his personal matters.
U.S. v. Falon. 959 F.2d 1143, 1148 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Voss, 774 F.2d at 404-05.
Documents described by this section are no more probable to be business related than
they are to be personal matters. Falon, 959 F.2d at 1148. In short, such a broad stroke invites a
fishing expedition and not a carefully structured search in line with the limits of the Fourth
Amendment. Furthermore, this paragraph also fails to limit the scope of documents to be seized
to a specific time period, specific customers or specific transactions.
Paragraph C
Records in whatever form relating to mailing and receipt of parcels and packages
whether U.S. Mail or other common carrier.
R. 288 (Addendum A).
This paragraph, "is a broad description permitting a review of all of the incoming and
outgoing mail of Norris, Maxtron, Santos or United." R. 297 (Addendum D). Furthermore, this
provision gives no guidelines to the executing officers that would allow them to differentiate
between Mr. Norris' personal and business activities. This paragraph offers no limiting
instruction to a searching officer but leaves to the officer's discretion what should and should not
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be seized, a result not permitted by the Fourth Amendment. Voss, 774 F.2d at 404-05; Galtegos,
712P.2dat209.
Paragraph D
Safes, indicia of safe deposit boxes, storage facilities or similar devices used for
storage or records or belonging and applications for mail drop boxes.
R. 288 (Addendum A).
There is no indication that evidence of a crime was being held in a safe. The crime the
State has alleged is Communications Fraud. Nowhere in the affidavit in support of the search
warrant is there any suggestion criminal contraband or evidence might be found in Mr. Norris'
personal safe. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (The affidavit must support
the magistrate's decision that there is a "fair probability" that evidence of the crime will be found
in the place or places named in the warrant).
As with other provisions in the warrant, this provision would allow the seizure of any
item Mr. Norris kept in a safe whether related to his business or personal life. Again, this section
of the warrant impermissibly grants broad discretion to an administrative officer.
Paragraph E
Promotional materials in whatever form showing the information provided to
customers and initial solicitation, including copies of the promissory notes and/or
advertising contracts. Copies of any video and/or audio tapes.
R.288 (Addendum A).
This may be the most narrowly drawn paragraph and does provide some guidance to a
searching officer. However, information was available to the investigator that would have
allowed him to narrow the scope of this paragraph to include items relating to a specific time
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period, to specific customers set out in the affidavit or specific transactions. R. 285, ^ 4
(Addendum B).
Paragraph F
Copies of any and all general correspondence and business records including:
client statements; client contracts and/or proposals; subcontract agreements and/or
contracts; materials describing company concepts; audio/visual materials;
invoices for the purchase of or services performed for the editing, marketing,
drafting or graphic design, printing and/or binding of various publications; bank
statements; ledgers; books of accounts; accounting and/or financial records
detailing the daily business activity of the companies; personal diaries, telephone
logs; appointment books; checkbooks, information pertaining to safe deposit
boxes; records indicating the location of assets; warehouse shipping and receiving
records; commission and payroll records; travel records; employee applications;
marketing scripts; all corporate books and records; documentation of fictitious
names used by company officers and employees; mailing and/or shipping records
for both public and private carriers; lease agreements; employment contracts;
partnership agreements; any and all records which identify or pertain to
individuals having managerial or supervisory responsibility, including, but not
limited to, records pertaining to Richard Franklin Norris and Emilio Cortez; stock
certificates and investment records.
R. 287-88 (Addendum A).
The trial judge found, "taken literally, this paragraph directs the executing officers to
back a truck up to the door and take every business record or file having to do with Norris,
Maxtron, Santos or United." R. 296 (Addendum D). Furthermore, "on its face, this paragraph
directs search for and seizure of all business records. There is no limitation, no restriction." R.
296 (Addendum D). The trial judge went on to observe, "in a clarifying phrase the paragraph
authorized search for and seizure of such patently irrelevant records as personal diaries, payroll
records and employee applications. Arguably other records identified also are entirely irrelevant,
such as lease agreements, employment contracts, travel records and partnership agreements." R.
296 (Addendum D). The trial judge went on to say, "when read in conjunction with the very
12

broad authorizations set forth in paragraphs A, B and C, the warrant crosses the line from
constitutionality to unconstitutionality. It is altogether too broad." R. 296 (Addendum D).
This paragraph includes categories that were specifically disallowed under Falon as they
would inevitably contain personal information and are no more likely to contain evidence of a
criminal act than contain items of a personal nature. 959 F.2d at 1148 (checkbooks cancelled
checks, telephone records, calendars, diaries, and word processors are no more likely to be
related to a defendant's fraudulent business than to his personal matters). This paragraph allows
the searching officer to exercise his own discretion to determine what should be seized rather
than placing that discretion in the hands of the proper judicial authority.
"A warrant that simply authorizes the seizure of all files, whether or not relevant to a
specified crime, is insufficiently particular." Voss, 774 F.2d at 406. The vagueness of the present
search warrant allowed a fishing expedition of the personal records of Mr. Norris by not
differentiating between business and personal records.
The unrestricted language of the search warrant inevitably resulted in the seizure of
personal items which would require extraordinary proof to show that Mr. Norris' entire life was
consumed by fraud. Falon, 959 F.2d at 1148; see also R. 258-63 (Addendum C, inventory and
return of items seized, detailing items seized including information related to Laroe International
which was not authorized by the search warrant). This standard of extraordinary proof has not
been established through the warrant or the affidavit.
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Paragraph G
Any and all information concerning the subject businesses stored in the form of
magnetic or electronic coding on computer or with the aid of computer-related
equipment. These media include floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, removable
hard disk cartridges, tapes, laser disks, printer buffers, smart cards, memory
calculators, electronic notebooks, and any other media which is capable of storing
magnetic coding. Any and all electronic devices which are capable of analyzing,
creating, displaying, converting or transmitting electronic or magnetic computer
impulses or data. These devices include computers, computer components,
computer peripherals, word processing equipment, modems, monitors, printers,
plotters, encryption circuit boards, optical scanners, external hard drives, and any
other computer related electronic devices. Including operating systems,
application software, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other programs
or software used to communicate with the computer hardware or peripherals either
directly or indirectly via telephone lines, radio, or other means of transmission.
R. 287 (Addendum A).
This paragraph suffers from the same deficiencies of the previous paragraph. Like
paragraph F, this paragraph fails to give any limitations on what can be seized and enumerates
items that inevitably would contain personal items and are not more related to business activities
than to personal activities. The trial judge found this paragraph allows the State, "carte blanche to
review every single computer file of Norris, Maxtron, Santos or United. This authorization is
over broad." R. 293 (Addendum D).
In Leary, the court found the warrant invalid because it only contained two limitations on
the search,
First, the documents to be seized had to fall within a long list of business records
typical of documents kept by an export company. Second, those documents had to
relate to the "purchase, sale and illegal exportation of materials in violation of
the" federal export laws. In this context - the search of the offices of an export
company - these limitations provide no limitation at all. The warrant authorizes,
and the custom agents conducted, a general search of the Kleinberg offices.
846 F.2d at 600-01.
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In this case, the extensive laundry list of items listed, in reality provide no limitation at all
on the scope of the search. Furthermore, the warrant fails to specify with particularity the items
to be seized. This had the impermissible result of allowing the executing officers unlimited
discretion in choosing what and what not to seize. Indeed this warrant allowed exactly what the
trial judge found, "a general rummaging through all of the business records of Norris, Maxtron,
Santos and United." R. 293 (Addendum D). This search warrant is simply unconstitutionally
over broad on its face.
B.

Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution proscribes the issuance of general
warrants.
Although the language of Article I, Section 14 is nearly identical to the Fourth

Amendment, the Utah Supreme Court has often interpreted the Utah constitution as affording
greater protection than its federal counterpart to individuals. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465
(Utah 1990); State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415, 416-17 (Utah 1991); Zissi v. State Tax
Commission of Utah. 842 P.2d 848, 859 (Utah 1992). With this in mind, the Utah Supreme
Court has recognized, "a central purpose of the requirement of a warrant, issued under the
authority of a neutral magistrate, is to protect against 'general, exploratory rummaging in a
person's belongings.' To this end, a warrant should leave nothing to the discretion of the
officer executing it." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1217 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
Arguably even if the search warrant is not over broad by the standards of the Fourth
Amendment it could still be over broad under the broader protection of Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution.
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The search warrant in this case is over broad under the Fourth Amendment. For the same
reasons, the search warrant is also over broad under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. However, if the search warrant is not over broad under the Fourth Amendment this
Court may still find the warrant over broad under an analysis of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution that may provide greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizure than
its federal counterpart.
II. THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT FAILS TO ESTABLISH A FAIR
PROBABILITY THAT EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME WILL BE FOUND IN THE
PLACE OR PLACES NAMED IN THE WARRANT.
In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a search warrant, a magistrate is,
"to make a practical commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of the persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
The Court went on to say, "the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate
had a 'substantial basis for . . . concluding]' that probable cause existed. IdL at 238-39, 103 S.Ct.
at 2332. (citation omitted).
In determining if a magistrate had a substantial basis to issue the search warrant in this
case, a review of the affidavit is necessary. A review of the search warrant at issue in this case
reveals an affidavit permeated with fatal constitutional deficiencies, such as, conclusions of the
administrative officer, failure to state the basis of knowledge of many of the statements and
statements based on stale information.
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A.

Irrelevant paragraphs
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that information that does not aid the magistrate in

her probable cause determination is irrelevant in a review of whether the warrant was properly
issued. State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Ut. App. 1993). Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 did not
provide the magistrate with facts establishing probable cause that would aid the magistrate in
concluding that evidence of criminal activity would be found in the target locations.
Paragraph 1 simply recites Agent Ronald Barton's training and experience. Nothing
within paragraph 1 establishes cause to believe evidence might be where the agent sought to
search. R. 286 (addendum B).
Paragraph 2 states that Agent Barton was working with other law enforcement officials.
Again this is not information that would help to establish probable cause. R. 286 (addendum B).
Paragraph 3 sets out the allegations being investigated, communications fraud, money
laundering and racketeering. R. 285 (addendum B). This paragraph provides no facts to the
magistrate that would assist her in determining if evidence of criminal activity would be found at
the target locations.
Paragraph 4 states that Agent Barton either interviewed or read memorandums of
interviews of a list of various individuals. R. 285 (addendum B). The paragraph does not detail
the substance of those interviews, thus, it provides no information to assist the magistrate.
Paragraph 5 simply states a conclusion that Agent Barton believes that evidence of
criminal conduct will be found at 4440 Christopherson Dr. #B, West Valley City, UT and 3392
West 3500 South, West Valley City, UT. R. 284-85 (addendum B). Again the agent's conclusion
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and description of the two locations he was requesting to search provide no useful information to
the magistrate to assist her in her probable cause determination.
None of these five paragraphs provided anything of value to the magistrate's probable
cause determination. Therefore, these paragraphs should not be viewed as having any bearing on
whether or not the magistrate was presented with a substantial basis upon which to justify the
issuance of a search warrant.
B.

Conclusory statements give a magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a
probable cause determination.
"Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to

determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of
others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate's duty does not occur, courts
must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are
issued." Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct at 2333.
Paragraphs 6, 9, 10-19 and 23 provide the magistrate with mere conclusions that do not
provide any facts on which the magistrate could base a finding of probable cause.
Paragraph 6 simply concludes that Mr. Norris was involved in a scheme to defraud
others. R. 284 (addendum B). This conclusion was of no use to the magistrate in making a
determination that criminal activity was afoot and evidence of that activity was likely to be found
at the two locations officers sought to search.
Paragraph 9 restates the conclusion that Mr. Norris is involved in a scheme to defraud and
then broadens the conclusion by alleging Mr. Norris' use of several businesses, Maxtron
(formerly known as Alta Publishing), Santos International and United Investors to perpetrate the
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scheme to defraud. R. 283 (addendum B). This paragraph provides no objective facts on which a
magistrate could make her own common sense determination that a scheme to defraud others
existed and that evidence of that scheme would be found at Mr. Norris' residence and place of
business.
Paragraphs 10 through 19 set out in conclusory fashion the State's allegation of a
fraudulent scheme administered by Mr. Norris. R. 279-83 (addendum B). However these
paragraphs also suffer from the additional deficit of failing to state the basis of knowledge
supporting the allegations made in these paragraphs. This additional deficiency will be discussed
below.
Paragraph 23 states a conclusion that computers as well as all related hardware need to be
seized in order to allow a computer expert to examine the information contained on the
computer. R. 271 (addendum B). Additionally, this paragraph provides irrelevant information as
discussed above. A review of the conclusions and irrelevant information in this paragraph fail to
give the magistrate any facts to make a common sense determination that probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed and that evidence of that crime would be located at either
one of the locations.
Conclusory statements give a magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment
regarding probable cause. Id The conclusions in the paragraphs detailed above did not provide
the magistrate with the necessary information to make an appropriate finding that probable cause
existed to believe evidence of a crime would be found at either Mr. Norris' home or his place of
business. Furthermore, these conclusory paragraphs failed to establish sufficient facts to allow a
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magistrate to make an independent conclusion that Mr. Norris and his businesses were so
pervaded with fraud that an all records search warrant was necessary.
C.

A totality of the circumstances review of the affidavit includes consideration of the
basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information.
"The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision

whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
'veracity' and 4basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id.
(emphasis added).
Although the Supreme Court adopted the totality of the circumstances test, an evaluation
of the basis of knowledge and veracity of individuals supplying information for the affidavit are
important components of the analysis. Id. In discussing the basis of knowledge, the Supreme
Court stated,
The magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from
which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they
were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded
that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed was credible or his
information reliable. Otherwise, the inferences from the facts which lead to Ihe
complaint will be drawn not by a neutral and detached magistrate, as the
Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-15, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514 (1964) (citations omitted). In
applying this concept to the case, the Court noted, "the affidavit here not only contains no
affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of matters contained
therein, it does not even contain an affirmative allegation that the affiant's unidentified source
spoke with personal knowledge." Id 378 U.S. at 113, 84 S.Ct. at 1513.
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Similar problems were pointed out in Spinelli v. U.S.. 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969).
In Spinelli, the Court noted that there was not a sufficient statement of the underlying
circumstances from which an informant concluded the defendant was involved in criminal
activity. 393 U.S. at 416, 84 S.Ct. at 589. In discussing why the underlying circumstances were
insufficient, the Court points out that the we are not told how the informant received his
information nor if the informant personally observed the activity the police officer claimed that
he observed. IdL Without knowing how an individual providing information for the affidavit
received the information and without knowing why that information should be relied on, a
magistrate simply cannot form an independent conclusion about the reliability of the information.
Paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,18, 19, 20 and 21 fail to state where the information
contained in those paragraphs came from and the basis of knowledge of the allegations contained
in those paragraphs. These paragraphs fail to establish sufficient objective facts to allow the
magistrate to draw her own conclusion about alleged criminal activity and the likelihood that
evidence of that criminal activity would be found at Mr. Norris' home or business. Therefore,
after a practical common sense review of the affidavit, there is no substantial basis to conclude
probable cause existed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. at 2333.
Paragraph 10 in addition to being conclusory, fails to state the source of this information.
R. 10 (addendum B). Without knowing the source of information or how the source obtained the
information the magistrate is placed in a position to try a make a common sense determination
without knowing anything about the veracity of the source of the information or the basis of
knowledge. Without knowing anything about the veracity and basis, the magistrate is not
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presented the totality of the circumstances and is unable to make a reasonable determination of
probable cause.
Paragraph 11 suffers from the same deficiency as paragraph 10, in that it is conclusory
and fails to identify where the information came from and the basis of knowledge. R. 282
(addendum B). Failing to identify this critical information for the magistrate and setting the facts
out in an objective fashion makes it impossible for the magistrate to use this information to
conclude probable cause of a crime existed and that evidence of the crime could be found at Mr.
Norris' home and business.
In paragraph 13 the majority of the information appears to come from the text of a
promissory note. R. 281 (addendum B). Conspicuously absent from the reference to the
promissory note is the date of the note, the identification of the parties signing the note, and any
other details that might identify the note.
The last two sentences of paragraph 13 allege that although the promissory note
established attorney fees at $2,000, Mr. Norris really only expended $200 in attorney fees. R. 281
(addendum B). This information is provided by a "former employee." As in paragraphs 10 and
11 the affidavit fails to establish who provided this information and how that person knows this
information and why it should be relied on by a neutral magistrate to conclude that it is evidence
of a crime.
Paragraph 14, in addition to drawing conclusions from apparent interviews, fails to state
once again where the information came from and what the basis of knowledge is. R. 281
(addendum B). Agent Barton appears to base the information in this paragraph on interviews he
conducted himself (with whom we do not know) and written reports of interviews (again with
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whom we do not know) by other law enforcement officers. R. 281 (addendum B). The problem
begins to be compounded as hearsay is stacked on hearsay, and we still have no idea who is
providing this information, if they are credible sources of information and how they came to
learn this information.
Paragraphs 15 throughl9 continue the pattern over and over again of drawing conclusions
and failing to state where the information stated comes from and how the source of information
knows what is stated in the paragraph. R. 279-80 (addendum B).
In the entire affidavit, the only time we are informed of where the information comes
from, other than those paragraphs relating to a vague promissory note, are paragraphs 20 and 21
and all their sub-parts. R. 271-79 (addendum B). Arguably, paragraphs 20 and 21 are the only
paragraphs in the entire affidavit that provide sufficient information to allow a magistrate to
make any conclusions at all.
Paragraph 20 and it's sub-parts stem from an interview of a former employee of Mr.
Norris', Karen Nolan, who worked for him for approximately six months. R. 279 (addendum B).
Although much of the information set out in paragraph 20 and it's sub-parts comes from an
interview with Ms. Nolan, instead of simply stating what Ms. Nolan saw, heard or said, the
affidavit borders on conclusion in the manner it sets out the substance of the interview with Ms.
Nolan. For example, sub-paragraph a, instead of stating how Ms. Nolan knew that Mr. Norris
obtained judgments in Florida and then had them registered in Utah, the affidavit states in
conclusory fashion simply that Mr. Norris did these things. R. 278 (addendum B). This is a
conclusion that should be made by a neutral magistrate after observing the objective facts, not by
the administrative officer seeking the search warrant.
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Sub-paragraph b, fails to state Ms. Nolan's basis of knowledge for knowing that Mr.
Norris did not spend $350 in attorney fees for his attorney in Florida. R. 278 (addendum B). How
Ms. Nolan knows this information is important in order for the magistrate to make a proper
evaluation of the weight to give it. Moreover, neither sub-paragraphs a or b provide information
that would lead a magistrate to believe a crime has been committed and that evidence of that
crime is likely to be found at Mr. Norris' home or business.
The remaining sub-paragraphs of paragraph 20 contain somewhat vague statements from
Ms. Nolan's interview, sprinkled with conclusions and a persistent omission of Ms. Nolan's
basis of knowledge. R. 275-78 (addendum B). A common sense review of paragraph 20 would
not lead a court to conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis for believing a crime had
been committed and that evidence of that crime would be found at the locations lawr enforcement
desired to search.
Paragraph 21 sets forth information gleaned by the affiant, Agent Barton, from several
interviews conducted by another investigator with another former employee, Suzanne DeHerrera.
R. 274-75 (addendum B). These sub-paragraphs appear to suffer from many of the same
problems previously noted. The most prevalent deficiency appears to be a lack of a statement of
Ms. DeHerrera's basis for knowing the information alleged in the sub-paragraphs in addition to
sporadic conclusory statements.
Sub-paragraphs d through f and h through j fail to state the basis of knowledge and
contain conclusory statements. R. 271-74 (addendum B). For example, sub-paragraph d alleges a
system of mailing notices to Pennsylvania where the notices are then redistributed and mailed
back to Utah with a Pennsylvania postmark. R. 274 (addendum B). The question that
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immediately comes to mind is, "how does Ms. DeHerrera know this?" The affidavit fails to
demonstrate how Ms. DeHerrera knows this information, therefore, it is very difficult to make an
informed determination of how credible this information is.
Other examples of problematic statements are found in sub-paragraphs i and j . In those
paragraphs there are allegations that Mr. Norris maintains a computer back-up as well as other
business records and audio tapes at his home. R. 271-71 (addendum B). However, once again the
question that immediately arises is, "how does Ms. DeHerrera know this?" There is absolutely no
statement anywhere in the affidavit indicating that Ms. DeHerrera has ever been inside of Mr.
Norris' home or has any other reason to know what can be found in his private residence. What
makes these two paragraphs even more disturbing is that they seem to be the only two paragraphs
in the entire affidavit on which law enforcement officers attempt to justify a search of Mr.
Norris' home.
Finally, paragraph 24 simply sets out the exhaustive list of items law enforcement sought
to seize and already discussed above in Mr. Norris' argument that the search warrant was over
broad. R. 267-71 (addendum B). These paragraphs simply detail the State's wish list of items
they wanted to seize. These paragraphs do not add anything of substance that would assist a
magistrate in making a probable cause determination and are therefore irrelevant as discussed
above.
This affidavit is saturated with deficiencies. In reviewing this affidavit in a common sense
fashion and considering the deficiencies, it is clear that a magistrate could not have had a
substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed to issue this search warrant. Even giving
this affidavit the benefit of the doubt it, is questionable whether a magistrate had a substantial
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basis to issue even a narrowly tailored search warrant seeking specific items of alleged
contraband. Clearly, given the questionable nature of the affidavit there is no way a magistrate
could have concluded, from the information presented, that every aspect of Mr. Norris' business
and personal life were so pervaded with fraud that an all records search warrant, which is
unprecedented in Utah, was necessary.
D.

The magistrate failed to make a specific finding, based on the affidavit, that Mr.
Norris' business and personal life were so permeated with fraud that an all records
search warrant was necessary.
The State argues that Mr. Norris' business was a sophisticated and pervasive scheme to

defraud which necessitated the search of all business records to enable investigators to expose the
fraud in its entirety. In its argument, the State asks this court to do what the magistrate failed to
do in issuing the warrant in question, that is, to make a probable cause finding to justify the over
broad reach of the warrant. In short, the State asks this Court to, in a legal sense, shut the gate
after the horses have run off.
The duty of the magistrate is to limit warrants to within constitutional limits and avoid,
"general warrants whereby administrative officers determine what is and what is not to be seized.
The decision to seize must be judicial, as opposed to administrative, and the warrant must be
sufficiently particular to guide the officer to the thing intended to be seized, thereby minimizing
the danger of unwarranted invasion of privacy." Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 209 (emphasis added).
The warrants in both Voss and Learv suffered from the exact same deficiency as the
present warrant, over breadth. 774 F.2d 402; 846 F.2d 592. In both Voss and Learv, the courts
were careful to point out that search warrants allowing the seizure of all the records of a
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particular business might be constitutionally valid. Voss, 774 F.2d at 406; Learv, 846 F.2d at
600. In fact, the Tenth Circuit pointed out in Voss,
Where a warrant authorizes the seizure of particularly described records relevant
to a specific crime and all of an organization's records, in fact, fall into that
category, they may all lawfully be seized. However, a warrant that simply
authorizes the seizure of all files, whether or not relevant to a specified crime, is
insufficiently particular.
774 F.2d at 406.
This concept was implemented by the Tenth Circuit in U.S. v. Hargus J 28 F.3d 1358
(10th Cir. 1997). In Hargus, the Tenth Circuit upheld a very broad search warrant stating, "we are
satisfied that it (the warrant) is sufficiently limited and specific, in view of the nature of this
extended conspiracy . . . to 'allow the executing officers to distinguish between items that may
and may not be seized.'" 128 F.3d at 1362-63 (citations omitted) (parenthetical added).
Mr. Norris' case is distinguishable from Hargus because in Hargus there was a much
more detailed affidavit in support of the broad search warrant. In discussing the affidavit the
Tenth Circuit stated,
The affidavit recited the sting operation (which involved a law enforcement
officer who sold stolen oil to the defendant and recorded the transaction by use of
a body transmitter) in which Mr. Hargus bought stolen oil at his reclaiming yard;
it described the conspiracy between Hargus, Johnson, and Dice; and it described
oil transfer reports and daily time sheets provided to the affiant by Mr. Johnson
and his employer, indicating that the trafficking in stolen oil had been going on
for at least three months. In our view these facts alone establish probable cause for
the warrant.
Id. 128 F.3d at 1362 (parenthetical added). The affidavit in the Hargus case provided much more
specific and detailed information than the affidavit in our current case. Unlike our case, much of
the information in the affidavit was gathered first hand by a law enforcement officer, for
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example, the law enforcement officer participated personally in the illicit transaction. Id. 128
F.3d at 1360-61. In considering the strong, detailed and specific statements set out in the
affidavit in Hargus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the list of items sought by the search
warrant, (which is dwarfed by the length and shear number of items sought by the warrant in the
present case), was sufficiently limited to allow administrative officers to distinguish between
what to seize and what not to seize. 128 F.3d atl362-63.
While a magistrate may find probable cause to issue a properly restricted search warrant,
she must make the additional specific probable cause finding, based on the evidence before it,
"that fraud pervaded every aspect" of the business. Voss, 774 F.2d at 406. Absent that specific
finding, warrants allowing for the "rummaging through all the business records" are
constitutionally prohibited.
The question is not, as the State suggests, "Could a magistrate have possibly made a
probable cause finding that Mr. Norris' business was an "instrumentality of fraud?" The relevant
question is, "Did the magistrate make that specific probable cause finding?" In Voss, Leary, and
this case, the magistrate did not, making the warrants overbroad, general warrants.
A finding that the magistrate simply could have found probable cause would render
meaningless the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement mandating a finding of
probable cause prior to issuing a warrant. State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App.1992)
(It is well settled that before issuing a search warrant, a neutral magistrate must review an
affidavit containing specific facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause). The
necessity of a finding of probable cause, by a detached, neutral magistrate, is to prevent illegal
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searches. Justification after the fact would abrogate the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
E.

The search warrant was based on stale information.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that for probable cause information to support

the issuance of a search warrant, "the proof must be of facts so closely related to the time of the
issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time." SRO v. United States,
287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932). There is no bright line rule regarding the passing of a certain amount
of time to resolve staleness issues. Instead, in determining staleness problems courts should focus
on the nature of the particular crime or crimes the probable cause information is alleged to
establish.
In United States v. Redistill 987 F.2d 1383, 1391 (8th Cir. 1993), the court held that a
five month delay to obtain notes in the defendant's office was too long. Likewise, in United
States v. Neal 500 F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1974), the court ruled that a three to five month delay
regarding information about stolen auto parts could not provide probable cause in support of the
warrant. See also. Re: Grand Jury Proceeding, 716 F.2d at 498-99 (warrant seeking the seizure of
records of a business from 1976 to 1983 was held to be an invalid general warrant as the alleged
crime took place only in the later part of that time period).
In this case, the state relied upon statements made by two of Mr. Norris' former
employees. Paragraph 20 of the affidavit discusses information provided by Ms. Nolan. Ms.
Nolan worked from October 1995 to March of 1996. R. 279 (addendum B). By the time the
warrant was signed and executed, in early April of 1997, it had been more than a year since Ms.
Nolan worked for Mr. Norris.
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The affidavit also relies on information provided by Ms. DeHerrera which is discussed in
paragraph 21. Ms. DeHerrera worked part-time for Mr. Norris during the single month of
November 1996. R. 274-75 (addendum B). Ms. DeHerrera left Mr. Norris' employment some six
months before the execution of the search warrant.
This stale information, provided by Ms. Nolan and Ms. DeHerrera, covers eight pages of
the twenty-one page affidavit.
The affiant, Agent Barton, indicates that he relied on a personal review of documents and
interviews conducted by two other investigators. R. 281-82 (addendum B). For example, the
affiant discusses promissory notes that he has reviewed that contained certain, "confession of
judgment" provisions that permitted Mr. Norris to sue in Pennsylvania. R. 281-82 (addendum B).
Nowhere does the affiant indicate the date of those promissory notes, when lawsuits were filed or
any other information that would place the documents into a time context relative to the timing
of the search warrant.
The same problem comes up with the interviews conducted by the other investigators.
The affiant did not disclose when those interviews were conducted, so there is no way to
determine if the interviews occurred days before the magistrate reviewed the affidavit and signed
the warrant or months or years earlier. R. 281 (addendum B). Moreover, even if the interviews
had been conducted just prior to the issuance of the warrant, there is insufficient information to
determine when Mr. Norris' alleged conduct occurred in relation to the issuance of the warrant.
The alleged conduct could have happened a few months before the affiant swore out the affidavit
or years earlier.
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The affidavit either provides stale information in support of probable cause or is simply
silent as to facts that would place the information into a time context relative to the issuance the
search warrant. The staleness of the information and the lack of a time reference compound the
already significant problems in the affidavit. In considering all of the deficiencies of the affidavit,
there is no substantial basis in the affidavit to establish probable cause to support a search
warrant.
F.

Expunged information should not have been included in the affidavit in support of
the search warrant.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9(5) (1999) defines expungement as, "the sealing or destruction

of a criminal record, including records of the investigation, arrest, detention, or conviction of the
petitioner." One effect of an expungement is the record becomes sealed information contained in
that record may not be used against Mr. Norris. "The persons who have access to sealed record or
whose testimony is bolstered by reference to it cannot be allowed to 'recreate' the record in
proceedings subsequent to the expungement." Ambus v. Utah State Board of Education, 800
P.2d 811,813 (1990). Likewise, "once the police department received the expungement order,
employees of the department could not then testify concerning information contained in the
expunged record." Ambus v. Granite Board of Education, 975 F.2d 1555, 1567 (10th Cir. 1992).
In the present case, information contained in the affidavit to support the warrant was
obtained through records included in the arrest and investigation of Mr. Norris on charges
dismissed December 10, 1996 and subsequently expunged. Specifically, the affidavit contains
allegations from two former employees, Ms. Nolan and Ms. DeHerrera, who testified during the
expunged action. As the information received by the two former employees was subject to the
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expungement order, the use of the testimony should not be allowed under the rule set forth above
concerning use of expunged information in subsequent proceedings.
III. THE AFFIDAVIT AND ACTUAL SEARCH WARRANT ARE SO INADEQUATE
THAT NO REASONABLE OFFICER COULD RELY ON THEM, THEREFORE, THE
LEON GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE.
A.

The good faith exception does not apply when the warrant is based on an affidavit
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable.
The State is correct that under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence the good faith

exception articulated in U.S. v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), can save an
otherwise technically deficient warrant by application of the "good faith" exception. In Leon the
United States Supreme Court held that because the exclusionary rule is meant to deter police
misconduct, evidence obtained by officers action in objective good faith reliance on the legality
of a warrant is admissible even though the warrant is later found to be invalid. 468 U.S. at 92023.
The Leon court outlined four situations that would make the "good faith" exception
inapplicable: 1) the magistrate was misled by false information in the affidavit, 2) the magistrate
abandoned a neutral, detached, judicial role, 3)the warrant was facially deficient in describing the
place to be searched or the things to be seized, and 4) the warrant is based on an affidavit so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable. Id, 468 U.S. at 923; State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303 (Ut. App. 1989).
The affidavit in this case is an example of a probable cause assertion that is so lacking in
substance that the officer executing the warrant could not have reasonably and objectively relied
upon it, notwithstanding the magistrate's issuance of the warrant.
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As discussed above, the affidavit in this case has multiple and serious deficiencies. After
wading through twenty-one pages of conclusions, statements failing to identify the basis of
knowledge (not to mention statements involving multiple levels of hearsay) and statements of
stale information it is clear that an officer executing the warrant could not have reasonably and
objectively relied upon it.
The affidavit is so demonstrably deficient in its attempt to establish probable cause, the
executing officer's reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable nor did the officer act
in food faith reliance on the magistrate's determination. As the Utah Court of Appeals stated,
"when the magistrate receiving the affidavit in support of the search warrant is not presented with
sufficient facts to determine probable cause, the warrant cannot be relied upon by searching
officers." State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Ut. App. 1991). The affidavit in this case presents at
least one of the four situations noted by the Leon court where the "good faith" exception should
not be applied.
B.

The good faith exception is inapplicable to a facially over broad search warrant.
When a warrant is so facially deficient in its description of the items to be seized that an

officer could not reasonably rely on it, the good faith exception is inapplicable. Leary, 846 F.2d
at 609; see also, United States v. Spilotro. 800 F.2d 959, 961 (9th Cir. 1986)(good faith exception
is inapplicable to facially over broad warrant).
As detailed above in the first section of this argument, the search warrant in this case was,
without doubt, facially over broad. The overbroad scope authorized by the warrant in this case is
so extreme that an executing officer could not have reasonably relied on the warrant. Therefore,
the good faith exception does not apply and will not save this search warrant.
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IV.

NO GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION IS RECOGNIZED UNDER ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

A state court may interpret its own constitution in a manner different from the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar federal provision so long as it does not reach a
result providing citizens with less rights than those guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States. Fox Film Corp. v. Mullen 296 U.S. 207, 210, 56 S.Ct. 183, 184 (1935); Herb v. Pitcairn.
324 U.S. 117,125-26, 65 S.Ct. 459, 463 (1945); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm.. 379
U.S. 487, 489, 85 S.Ct. 493, 494 (1965); Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984).
On several occasions Utah's highest court has shown a willingness to make substantive
law based solely on the Utah Constitution. See e.g., American Fork City v. Cosgrove. 701 P.2d
1069 (Utah 1989) (scope of privilege against self-incrimination); Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661
(Utah 1984) (automobile guest statute); State v. Ball 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984) (questioning a
juror about drinking alcohol); Gray v. Employment Security. 681 P.2d 807 (Utah 1987)
(Durham, J. concurring and dissenting, due process in re: unemployment benefits); State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (automobile exception to search warrant); State v.
Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (exception of privacy in bank records): Zissi v. State Tax
Commission of Utah. 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992) (Utah Constitutional exclusionary rule prevents
admission of illegally seized evidence at commission hearing). On other occasions the Court has
suggested it is inviting argument specifically on Utah Constitution Article I, Section 14. State v.
Hygh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Watts. 750
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988); Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution. 2 Utah Bar Journal 25 (Nov.
1989).
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It is clear that Utah's appellate courts have the authority to interpret Utah's constitutional
search and seizure provision differently than the corresponding federal provision. The Utah
Supreme Court has invited discussion of Utah Constitutional principles, has established a history
of reaching them and has developed Utah Constitutional law in variance with federal law. In this
context, it is proper for this Court to consider an interpretation of the Utah Constitution which
may be different from the federal constitutional holding.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah is this State's equivalent of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Utah Supreme Court has held that an exclusionary rule does apply to violations of
Article I, Section 14. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472; Thompson. 810 P.2d at 419. However, it does
not appear that Utah appellate courts have decided whether a good faith exception similar to the
one set out in United States v. Leon, is applicable to violations of Article I, Section 14. Larocco,
764 P.2d at 473; Thompson, 810 P.2d at 420; Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission. 841 P.2d 6,
11 (Utah 1992), n. 10.
Mr. Norris argues that no such "good faith" exception should save an improperly issued
search warrant from the effect of the Utah constitutional exclusionary rule. At least one Utah
appellate judge has opined that, "a healthy skepticism should permeate the court's consideration
[of a good faith exception to Article I, Section 14] in view of the troublesome analysis in Leon."
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 743 (appendix to opinion) (brackets added). The Supreme Court noted on one
occasion, without comment, that Connecticut has found a good faith exception incompatible with
its constitution. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 420, n. 4. On another occasion the Court noted that
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several states have rejected a Leon-type invalid warrant exception in relation to their own
constitutions. Sims 841 P.2d at 11, n.10 &11.
States that have expressly rejected a good faith exception to their state constitutions are as
follows: New York, People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985) (exclusionary rule's
purpose would be frustrated, a premium would be placed on illegal police action, would create
incentive to others to act illegally); Michigan, People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2nd 308 (Mich. App.
1986) (exclusionary rule in its present form is necessary to preservation of right to be free from
unreasonable government intrusion); New Jersey, State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J.
1987) (would undermine police motivation to comply with constitutional requirement of
probable cause, would diminish quality of evidence presented in search warrant applications);
North Carolina, State v .Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988) (judicial integrity demands
suppression of illegally obtained evidence); Connecticut, State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn.
1990) (would discourage thorough police work, would encourage reviewing courts to simply
look for good faith instead of reviewing the probable cause requirement); Pennsylvania,
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Perm. 1991) (would clash with strong right of
privacy guaranteed in the Pennsylvania Constitution); Vermont, State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119
(Vt. 1991) (Vermont is not persuaded that the cost/benefit analysis of Leon is accurate); Idaho,
State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Id. 1991) ("we finally and unequivocally no longer adhere to a
policy of sheepishly following in the footsteps of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of state
constitutional analysis." The good faith exception is ill conceived); New Mexico, State v.
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993) (incompatible with the New Mexico Constitution).
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Gutierrez is especially instructive in its reasoning for rejecting a "good faith" exception to
invalid warrants. The New Mexico Supreme Court, noting that a divergence of opinions existed
nationwide in the developing cases both prior to and contemporary with the framing of the New
Mexico Constitution in 1910 (ratified in 1911) with regard to exclusionary rules as a means to
implement rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, concluded that it was impossible to
precisely determine the New Mexico framers' intent regarding an exclusionary rule or a "good
faith" exception; rather, the Court determined, "that the framers were aware of the controversy
and left interpretation to the courts rather than address the exclusion issue in the constitution." Id.
863 P.2d at 1065. The Gutierrez court held that a "good faith" exception was incompatible with
the New Mexico Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, (New
Mexico's constitutional provision is substantially similar to Utah's). 863 P.2d at 1068. The Court
held:
The approach we adopt today focuses not on deterrence or judicial integrity, nor
do we propose a judicial remedy; instead, our focus is to effectuate in the pending
case the constitutional right of the accused to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure . . . If, after consideration of the substantive constitutional issue, the
court decides that the state has transgressed the constitutional rights of a person
accused of a crime, we will not sanction that conduct by turning the other cheek.
The basis we articulate today for the exclusionary rule in this state - to effectuate
the constitutional right in the pending case - is incompatible with any exception
based on the good faith reliance of the officer on the magistrate's determination
either of probable cause or of the reasonableness of the search.
Id 863 P.2d at 1067-68.
The reasoning of the states that have rejected the good faith exception for their own
constitutions is compelling. Utah should not undermine the integrity of the judiciary, emasculate
Article I, Section 14, encourage sloppy police work or encourage lazy magisterial, trial and
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appellate court review by adopting a good faith exception to the State's constitution. Rather, as
with Gutierrez, Utah courts should recognize that the right of an accused to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizure should be implemented by a rule that holds illegally gained
evidence inadmissable, regardless of the good faith of the searching officer.
Further, when viewed in the historical context of its origination, Article I, Section 14 of
the Constitution of Utah can be seen as having an application different than that of the similar
provision of the United States Constitution.
It is generally recognized the original (non-native) settlers of this state, members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints or Mormons, a close and self sufficient society,
suffered from organized persecution that was not held in check (and quite probably was
encouraged) by three separate state governments. They undertook an arduous mass migration
over great distances to both avoid the persecution and maintain their religious-based society.
Once they arrived here they were made the further target of almost fifty years of federal pressure
because of the United States Congress' disapproval of their belief in polygamy.
In this setting, for the fifty years immediately preceding acceptance into the union,
several attempts were made at drafting a state constitution that would placate Congress. The
seventh draft, prohibiting polygamy, finally secured statehood. The development of the State's
present constitution and the intent of its various provisions, cannot be assessed without an
appreciation of these dynamics.
Article I, Section 14 (prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures) was drafted
by a people who thrice were not protected by their local governments from mob violence, who
fled to a place of total isolation from other societies and all governments, who endured ridicule
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and systematic federal prosecution of their membership as well as their leaders for their religious
belief (the evidence for such prosecutions - plural wives and co-habitants - being harbored in
their private homes), who maintained a public disagreement with the federal government for five
decades, and who were forced to suffer public humiliation before acceptance by the federal
government, would not have taken lightly the intrusion of those governments into their persons,
houses, papers and effects. K. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence
Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, 17 L. Contemp. L. 267, 276-281 (1991).
Unlike the framers of the United States Constitution, the framers of the Constitution of
Utah were drafting a constitution with the goal of joining the government that had oppressed it
rather than leaving the oppressive governing body. Article I, Section 14 is a reflection of the
people's feelings of hostility and distrust of a government perceived as inimical to their beliefs if
not their existence.
While the people's leaders had the federal text as a model for this section, they were also
personally targets of federal polygamy prosecutions. Firmage, Religion and the Law: The
Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth Century. 12 Cardozo Law Review 765, 771-78 (1991).
Consequently, the drafters of the various attempts at a state constitution very likely personally
experienced searches of their homes and effects in conjunction with Morrill and Edmunds
investigations and prosecutions. See, Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children of the Underground, 51
Utah Historical Quarterly 133 (1983) (recounting how a polygamist's home was searched 100
times in a four year period); "How They Do It," Deseret News Weekly, January 20, 1886 at 1
(explaining how federal marshals entered a polygamist's home without a warrant and by
breaking the door with and axe); Ivans, A Constitution for Utah. 25 Utah Historical Quarterly 95,
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100 (1957); White, The Making of the Convention of President: The Political Education of John
Henry Smith. 39 Utah Historical Quarterly 351, 357 (1971) (detailing how John H. Smith, a
Mormon Apostle and President of the constitutional convention of 1895 practiced polygamy and
had been the target of federal marshals' searches); Wallentine, at 279-80 ("Drafters of Utah's
early constitutions were intimately familiar with egregious searches of the sort unknown since
the days of King George... . Several members of the subcommittee selected to draft the
declaration of rights . .. had publicly protested search and seizure practices of federal
marshals.").
The totality of this societal and constitutional history of Utah, therefore, strongly suggest
a heightened appreciation and valuation of the privacy rights in personal effects - particularly
one's home - based on personal experience with and strong distrust of governmental intrusion.
From this history it is unlikely that the Utah Constitutional framers would have accepted the
concept that illegally gained evidence should be used against a citizen because the seizing officer
acted in "good faith."
The appellate courts of Utah have not recognized nor articulated a "good faith" exception
founded in the Utah Constitution. Sister states have recognized the folly of such an exception.
The history of the origination of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution suggest that its drafters
did not envision that the "good faith" of the executive branch of government should be the basis
for protection of constitutional rights.
No good faith exception currently exists under the Utah Constitution. If the search
warrant in this case is constitutionally inadequate the exclusionary rule as articulated by the Utah
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appellate courts is the adequate remedy and no good faith exception should redeem the deficient
search warrant.
CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments and authorities above, Mr. Norris respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the decision of the trial judge and suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the
constitutionally inadequate search warrant.
SUBMITTED this 2%_ day of April, 2001.

JARED W. ELDRID^
Attorney for Appellee/Defendant
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General, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-0854, this 2 £ day of April, 2001.

JAREI7 W. ELDRIDGE
Attorney for Appellee/Defendant
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Addenda

Addendum A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH:
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day
before me by Lt. Ronald C. Barton, I am satisfied that there is
probable cause to believe that
(X)

on the premises described as

(Site #1)

And

4440 Christopherson Dr. #B
West Valley City, UT

(Site #2)
3392 West 3500 South
West Valley City, UT

further described as: (Site #1): a two-story duplex, with tan
brick and white siding and a brown screen door. Including a
detached two-car garage and a metal storage shed behind the
duplex. The duplex is located on the west side of Christopherson
Drive and Unit B is located on the right (north) half of the
building.
(Site #2) : a single-story building located in an
office area North of 3500 South at 3392 West, the building is
part of complex of several similar buildings in a
commercial/industrial area, it has a glass front and the entire
row of buildings has a green roof extension over the front of the
offices. The entrance is on the east side of the building,
facing the parking area. No company name is located on the
building, and the company address of 3392 is located above the
entrance door.
in the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or
evidence described as:
Documents relating to the business activities of
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS and EMILIO CORTEZ# operating as

MAXTRON CORP. (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING), SAKTOS
INTERNATIONAL, and UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES,
INC.
These documents and computer files are more fully described
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
And that the above-described property or evidence;
( ) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully
possessed;
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public
offense;
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a
means of committing or concealing a public offense;
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of
illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the
illegal conduct;
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED:
(X) at any time during the daytime to make a search of the
above-described premises for the above-described property or
evidence, and if you find the same or any part thereof, to
bring it forthwith before me at the Third District Court,
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, OR to retain such
property in your custody, subject to the order of this
Court•
, & ^

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and date;
1997.

)URT

SHEILA ICMcCLEVE

EXHIBIT "A" TO THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Documents relating to the business activities of RICHARD
FRANKLIN NORRIS and EMILIO CORTEZ, operating as MAXTRON CORP.
(formerly ALTA PUBLISHING) , SANTOS INTERNATIONAL, and UNITED
INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC.
These documents are more particularly described as follows:
A) Records in whatever form of contacts with customers
and clients of MAXTRON CORP (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING); SANTOS
INTERNATIONAL; and UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC.,
including mailings, receipt of funds, and inquiries•
B) Banking records, accounting records, check registers,
deposit slips, money order receipts, receipts for cashiers
checks, cashiers checks, records of wire transfers in whatever
form showing the source and application of funds received from or
transferred to persons and/or entities.
C)
Records in whatever form relating to mailing and
receipt of parcels and packages whether U. S. Mail or other
common carrier.
D) Safes, indicia of safe deposit boxes, storage
facilities or similar devices used for storage of records or
belongings and applications for mail drop boxes.
E)
Promotional materials in whatever form showing the
information provided to customers and the initial solicitation,
including copies of promissory notes and/or advertising
contracts. Copies of any video and/or audio tapes.
F)
Copies of any and all general correspondence and
business records including: client statements; client
contracts and/or proposals; subcontract agreements and/or
contracts; materials describing company concepts; audio/visual
materials; invoices for the purchase of or services performed for
the editing, marketing, drafting or graphic design, printing
and/or binding of various publications; statements relating to
vendor accounts; canceled checks; bank statements; ledgers; books
of accounts; accounting and/or financial records detailing the
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daily business activity of the companies; personal diaries,
telephone logs; appointment books; checkbooks, information
pertaining to safe deposit boxes; records indicating the location
of assets; warehouse shipping and receiving records; commission
and payroll records; travel records; employee applications;
marketing scripts; all corporate books and records; documentation
of fictitious names used by company officers and employees;
mailing and/or shipping records for both public and private
carriers; lease agreements; employment contracts; partnership
agreements; any and all records which identify or pertain to
individuals having managerial or supervisory responsibility,
including, but not limited to, records pertaining to Richard
Franklin Norris and Emilio Cortez; stock certificates and
investment records.
G)
Any and all information concerning the subject
businesses stored in the form of magnetic or electronic coding
on computer or with the aid of computer-related equipment. These
media include floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, removable hard
disk cartridges, tapes, laser disks, printer buffers, smart
cards, memory calculators, electronic notebooks, and any other
media which is capable of storing magnetic coding. Any and all
electronic devices which are capable of analyzing, creating,
displaying, converting or transmitting electronic-or magnetic
computer impulses or data. These devices include computers,
computer components, computer peripherals, word processing
equipment, modems, monitors, printers, plotters, encryption
circuit boards, optical scanners, external hard drives, and any
other computer related electronic devices. Including operating
systems, application software, utility programs, compilers,
interpreters, and other programs or software used to communicate
with the computer hardware or peripherals either directly or
indirectly via telephone lines, radio, or other means of
transmission.
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Addendum B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

JUDGE

ADDRESS

RONALD BARTON, the undersigned affiant, being first duly sworn
upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a Special Agent for the Utah Attorney General's

Office, Consumer Rights Division, and have been so employed for
the past seven years, with prior law enforcement experience of
thirteen years.

I have received training in the investigation of

fraud and other financial crimes from the Utah Peace Officer
Standards and Training Academy and the Utah Attorney General's
Office.
2.

I am currently working with Randy Tuckett, U.S. Postal

Inspection Service and Kent Nelson, Investigator for the Utah
Division of Consumer Protection.

3.

Your affiant and the above named investigators have been

investigating allegations of communications fraud (Utah Code Ann.
Section 76-10-1801) money laundering (Utah Code Ann. Section 7610-1901) and racketeering (Utah Code Ann. Section 76-10-1601).
4.

During the course of my investigation, I have either

personally interviewed, or reviewed other investigative
memorandums of interviews, of the following persons: Kevin
Barkdull, Barkdull Plumbing; Darrell Garrett, Colonial Building
Supply; Dave Butler, Anderson Lumber; Charles Cole Mast; Bob
Nielsen, Mountain Fuel Supply; Rees and Yvonne Rasmussen, R & R
Drywall; Alan Nielson, A-Quality Plumbing & Heating; Joseph Bye,
Steve Peterson Interiors; Richard Foote, Foote Insurance Agency,
and former employees, Karen E. Noland and Suzanne DeHerrera.
5.

Based on investigative information, Affiant has reason to

believe that evidence of criminal conduct may be located:
(X) on the premises described as
(Site #1)
And
4440 Christopherson Dr. #B
West Valley City, UT

(Site #2)
3392 West 3500 South
West Valley City, UT

further described as: (Site #1): a two-story duplex, with tan
brick and white siding and a brown screen door. Including a
detached two-car garage and a metal storage shed behind the
duplex. The duplex is located on the west side of Christopherson
2

Drive and Unit B is located on the right (north) half of the
building.
(Site #2) : a single-story building located in an
office area North of 3500 South at 3392 West, the building is
part of complex of several similar buildings in a
commercial/industrial area, it has a glass front and the entire
row of buildings has a green roof extension over the front of the
offices. The entrance is on the east side of the building,
facing the parking area. No company name is- located on the
building, and the company address of 33 92 is located above the
entrance door.
6.

This Investigation has revealed that RICHARD NORRIS and

EMILIO CORTEZ, through various business entities, have engaged in
a scheme or schemes to defraud others,
7.

My review of corporate records on file with the Utah

Division of Corporations reveals the following: a) Maxtron Corp.
("Maxtron") was registered as a foreign corporation
(Pennsylvania) with the Division on April 5, 1995, with Richard
Norris listed as Director, President and Registered Agent; b)
Norris Publishing Company was registered with the Division on
April 19, 1979, with Richard Norris listed as Director, President
and Registered Agent; c) LaRoe International was registered with
the Division on October 5, 1993 as a dba for Norris Publishing,
listing Norris Publishing as Registered Agent.
8.

On or about December 17, 1996, Investigator Nelson

contacted the State of Pennsylvania and learned the following
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information:

a) Maxtron received a corporate registration on

January 30, 1995, with Richard Norris listed as the President;
b) Santos International received a corporate registration on
January 30, 1995, with Emilio Cortez listed as President; and c)
United Investors Credit Services, Inc. ("United
Investors")received a corporate registration on January 31, 1996
with Peggy Stone listed as President,

I have subsequently

learned that Peggy Stone is the aunt of Richard Norris,
9.

My investigation has revealed that the scheme to defraud

is currently being executed by Norris and Cortez as officers,
owners, and/or agents of Maxtron (formerly known as Alta
Publishing), Santos International, and United Investors through
the solicitation and sale of advertising in a "marketing"
brochure ("brochure") which is represented to be published on a
quarterly basis.
10.

Norris initially approaches general contractors

("generals") in Utah to solicit their approval of a quarterly
publication which includes some generic construction inserts and
advertising of the general's subcontractors ("subs"). He
represents to the generals that there will be no cost to them
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cause the costs will be paid in their entirety by the general's
bs and that the general will receive the brochure on a
arterly basis for distribution.
11.

Once Norris identifies subs used by the general, he

ntacts each sub and quotes a cost, including a discount, for
vertising.

Norris advises the subs that their general has

guested that he contact them.

Norris also represents to the

bs that advertising by the subs will reduce the cost of the
blication to the general.

The contractors are advised by

rris that the advertising fee entitles them to have an ad in
ch of the four printings of the brochure.

Subs are then asked

sign a Promissory Note ("note") and Advertising Agreement
agreement").
12.

My review of the agreements and notes indicates that the

tes require the sub to pay the principal amount of the note,
ss a substantial discount (usually 50%), in equal monthly
stallments ranging from one to twelve months.

The note

•ecifies the date such payments are to commence, normally within
drty days following the execution of the contract.

The note

.rther provides that if the sub fails to make any payment when

5

due, the holder of the note may require immediate payment of the
full, undiscounted amount of the note, refer the matter to an
attorney for collection, and bring suit to recover judgment.
13.

The notes also contain a paragraph which provides for a

"confession of judgment" pursuant to the laws of the State of
Pennsylvania.

The confession of judgment clause specifies that

judgment for the full, undiscounted sum of the note, together
with late fees, court costs, and attorneys fees may be entered
upon default in any monthly installment.

The note also

establishes that attorney fees "shall be not less or more than
$2,000."

I have been advised by a former employee that only $200

is paid to attorneys handling defaults on these notes.
14.

Based upon my interviews and my review of interviews

conducted by Investigator Nelson and Postal Inspector Tuckett, I
have found that Norris routinely stalls clients into default on
their notes through various misrepresentations after which he
exercises the default provisions of the note and executes
judgments in Pennsylvania pursuant to the confession of judgment
clause.
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15.

Although the notes make no reference to the printing

proofs for the subs' advertisements ("proofs"), during
negotiations and subsequent to the execution of the agreement and
note, Norris universally represents to the subs that they are not
required to begin making any payments until they receive and
approve the proofs.
16.

Within a short time after the execution of the agreement

and note, subs receive a letter from Santos International
advising them that Santos International has purchased their note
from Maxtron.

They also receive a letter from Maxtron advising

them of the sale of their note to Santos International.
17.

Again, shortly after receiving the letter from Santos

International, contractors receive another letter from Santos
International stating that Santos International has sold their
note to United Investors.

Shortly after notice from Santos

International, subs begin receiving notices and statements from
United Investors demanding payment on the note.
18.

During this time, Norris continues to assure the subs

that the proofs will arrive shortly and that they are not
required to pay until they receive the proofs. Norris also

7

represents to the subs that he is not affiliated in any way with
Santos International or United Investors.
19.

Based on the representations of Norris, most of the subs

have not made payments on the notes as required by the notes
because they have not yet received the proofs as promised by
Norris.

Consequently, when the payments are not paid as set

forth in the notes, Cortez and Norris, acting as officers,
agents, and/or owners of United Investors, exercise the default
provisions of the notes and execute uncontested judgments in
Pennsylvania.

Norris and Cortez then immediately have the

judgments docketed as a foreign judgment within the State of Utah
and proceed to execute upon these judgments by attempting to
seize vehicles, file liens, garnish wages, etc., upon an
individual and/or officer of a corporate entity.
20.

During the course of our investigation, Postal Inspector

Randy Tuckett has conducted several interviews of Karen Noland
who was employed by Norris as his office manager from
approximately October 1995 to March 1996. Ms. Noland has
provided the following information in these interviews:
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a)

During the first three months of her employment,

Norris operated the business under the name of Alta Publishing
which maintained a Florida post office box.

Accordingly, the

contracts provided that all actions must be filed in the State of
Florida.

Norris explained to Ms. Noland that the reason he

required that actions be filed in Florida was that it saved him
from having to go to court.

Ms. Noland typed the necessary court

documents and forwarded them to an attorney in Florida (five at a
time) for filing.

Norris then received a default judgment in

most, if not all cases, because the subs did not appear in the
Florida court.

Norris then filed a foreign judgment in Utah in

order to get a writ of execution and garnish bank accounts or
property.
b)

The Alta Publishing contracts also provided for

attorney's fees in the sum of $350.00.

However, Norris was not

required to pay his attorney in Florida $350.00.
c)

For the six months that Ms. Noland worked for Norris,

only one brochure was actually sent out to her knowledge.
However, there were files for approximately 6 or 7 magazines, all
of which were 6 to 8 weeks late for publishing.

9
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d)
Norris.

Ms. Noland also made collection calls on behalf of

During the course of her work to collect from subs,

every person she contacted told her that Norris had lied and
deceived them into purchasing the advertisement.

Some indicated

that Norris had represented that they had 72 hours to cancel but
after signing the contract they were told it could not be
canceled.

Others indicated that they had never received any

confirmation that the brochure was published, which, according to
Ms. Noland, was because they had not been published.
e)

On two occasions Ms. Noland was asked by Norris to

put together brochures from prior brochures so they could be used
by Norris in Small Claims Court to show that all brochures had
been published.
f)

On several occasions, Norris told Ms. Noland that he

did not mind suing the subs in court because suing the subs on
the contracts was actually how he made his money.

He further

indicated that the money from advertising barely covered the cost
of publishing the brochures.
g)

On or about January 1, 1996, Norris began operating

under the name of Maxtron based out of Pennsylvania.
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At that

time, Norris operated three companies out of his West Valley
office (Site #2), all presumably based in Pennsylvania: Maxtron,
Santos International, and United Investors.

The advertisement

was sold by Maxtron, and if the account was paid in full, it
remained with Maxtron.

However if the account was set up in

payments, 99% of which were, it was sold to Santos International
which was the purported publishing company.

The account was then

immediately sold by Santos International to United Investors
which was the collections company.
h) Ms. Noland sent all correspondence from these three
companies to Pennsylvania for mailing from a Pennsylvania post
office so that all mail had a Pennsylvania post mark.
i)

In addition, each "Pennsylvania" company had a

separate Pennsylvania telephone number which was automatically
forwarded to the West Valley office (Site #2).
j) Norris told Ms. Noland that the reason for the
Pennsylvania location of these companies was to take advantage of
Pennsylvania's "confession of judgment" laws which allowed Norris
to get a judgment against subs without the necessity of notifying
them or serving them with any papers.
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k) When he began the Pennsylvania companies, Norris also
substantially raised the amount for attorney's fees.
1) According to Ms. Noland, Norris never went to either
Florida or Pennsylvania while she worked there.

In addition,

Norris did not have any employees in either state.

His only

contacts in each state appeared to be the attorneys who filed the
legal documents.
m) On one occasion, Ms. Noland had to leave the West
Valley office (Site #2) due to a medical emergency and left her
car at the office.

When Norris returned to the office and found

her gone with her car in the parking lot, he went to Las Vegas,
Nevada.

He later contacted Ms. Noland and inquired of her as to

whether she had been questioned by the police.

When he returned

from Las Vegas, Norris instructed Ms. Noland to hang a piece of
paper in the office window if the police should ever question her
at the office while he was away.

Norris explained that she

should do this so he could leave the State if the police came.
21.

During the course of our investigation, Investigator Kent

Nelson and affiant have conducted several interviews of Suzanne
DeHerrera, formerly employed by Norris. Ms. DeHerrera was hired
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as a part-time secretary in November 1996, and has provided the
following information:
a)

Most of DeHerrera's work involved preparing and

issuing letters, notices, other correspondence, and legal
documents relating to the advertising agreements and notes.
Preparation of these documents is prepared on a computer and such
work is saved on the computer hard drive and/or disks and tapes.
b)

Pursuant to Norris' instructions, she signed many of

these documents as "Account Executive" for United Investors,
although she knew nothing about the account.
c)

Pursuant to Norris' direction, she prepared the

letters, notices, other correspondence, and legal documents on
behalf of all three corporations: Maxtron, Santos International
and United Investors.
d)

The letters, notices and other correspondence are

routinely sent in bulk to a Pennsylvania location where it is
then redistributed for mailing to the subs located in Utah.

The

legal documents prepared on behalf of Santos International and/or
United Investors are also sent to an attorney in Pennsylvania for
filing with the Pennsylvania courts.
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e)

The three Pennsylvania companies (Maxtron, Santos

International and United Investors) are all operated by Norris
from his West Valley office (Site #2). The locations identified
in the corporate records as the business addresses are merely
mail drops in Pennsylvania where Norris has someone collect the
mail on his behalf.

In addition, Norris operated other

businesses from his West Valley office (Site #2), including Alta
Publishing, Norris Publishing, and LaRoe International.
f)

Norris brought Cortez to Salt Lake from California

and the two currently share the same residence at 4440
Christopherson Dr. #B, West Valley City, Utah.

To her knowledge,

Cortez has an investigative background and he is responsible for
"tracking down" people that Norris files suit on.

Cortez is also

responsible for executing upon the judgments obtained from
Pennsylvania,

Norris has listed Cortez as the president of

Santos International.
g)

Peggy Stone is listed as the president of United

Investors and is the aunt of Norris.

DeHerrera stated that she

has never met Stone and Stone has never come into the office
while she has been there.

She stated that Stone has worked as an
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operator for U.S. West for the past 9 to 11 years.

DeHerrera

stated that she has seen the signature of Peggy Stone on various
documents, but states that it is Norris' signature, not Stone's.
h) Norris maintains a Maxtron bank account with Zions
Bank as well as accounts with Integra Bank and Pennsylvania Home
Savings in Pennsylvania.

Norris also maintains separate accounts

with other banking entities for Santos International, Norris
Publishing, Alta Publishing, LaRoe International and United
Investors.

Norris is the sole signatory on all accounts, opens

all mail and handles all incoming payments.
i) Norris routinely records all telephone conversations
at the West Valley office (Site #2) from both his personal desk
and from Cortez' desk; he maintains only one computer at the
office location where he has a tape back-up done weekly.

Norris

keeps a computer tape back-up at his home and another in a safe
which is also located at the office.

Norris maintains all of his

files in a back room of the office.
j) Norris maintains some business records at his
residence as well as a copy of the computer tape back-up and
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possibly some audio tapes, some archived records and various
weapons.
22.

I am aware from my investigation that Norris has pending

criminal charges in Salt Lake County for allegations involving
communications fraud involving his business practices through
LaRoe International.
23.

Your affiant is also aware through training, experience

and discussions with other law enforcement agents, that searches
and seizures of evidence from computers requires the seizure of
the computer as well as all related items such as hardware,
software and manuals.

This is necessary so that a qualified

computer expert can conduct a thorough, complete and accurate
examination of the evidence in a laboratory or other controlled
environment.
24.

Based on all the above facts and information, I have

reason to believe that RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS and EMILIO CORTEZ,
operating as MAXTRON CORP. (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING), SANTOS
INTERNATIONAL, and UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC. are
currently engaged in communications fraud to obtain money through
misrepresentation and fraud.

I have reason to believe that they
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have committed violations of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-10-1801
(Communications Fraud); Utah Code Ann. Section 76-10-1901 (Money
Laundering); and Utah Code Ann. Section 76-10-1601 (Pattern of
Unlawful Activity), and that there is now concealed on the
premises known as 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah,
and, 4440 Christopherson, West Valley City, Utah, property that
constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense;
contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally
possessed; property designed or intended for use or which is or
has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense, in
violation of the Utah statutes previously mentioned;
specifically:
A)

Records in whatever form of contacts with customers

and clients of MAXTRON CORP (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING); SANTOS
INTERNATIONAL; and UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC.,
including mailings, receipt of funds, and inquiries.
B)

Banking records, accounting records, check registers,

deposit slips, money order receipts, receipts for cashiers
checks, cashiers checks, records of wire transfers in whatever
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form showing the source and application of funds received from or
transferred to persons and/or entities.
C)

Records in whatever form relating to mailing and

receipt of parcels and packages whether U. S. Mail or other
common carrier.
D)

Safes, indicia of safe deposit boxes, storage

facilities or similar devices used for storage of records or
belongings and applications for mail drop boxes.
E)

Promotional materials in whatever form showing the

information provided to customers and the initial solicitation,
including copies of promissory notes and/or advertising
contracts.
F)

Copies of any video and/or audio tapes.
Copies of any and all general correspondence and

business records including: client statements; client
contracts and/or proposals; subcontract agreements and/or
contracts; materials describing company concepts; audio/visual
materials; invoices for the purchase of or services performed for
the editing, marketing, drafting or graphic design, printing
and/or binding of various publications; statements relating to
vendor accounts; canceled checks; bank statements; ledgers; books
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of accounts; accounting and/or financial records detailing the
daily business activity of the companies; personal diaries,
telephone logs; appointment books; checkbooks, information
pertaining to safe deposit boxes; records indicating the location
of assets; warehouse shipping and receiving records; commission
and payroll records; travel records; employee applications;
marketing scripts; all corporate books and records; documentation
of fictitious names used by company officers and employees;
mailing and/or shipping records for both public and private
carriers; lease agreements; employment contracts; partnership
agreements; any and all records which identify or pertain to
individuals having managerial or supervisory responsibility,
including, but not limited to, records pertaining to Richard
Franklin Norris and Emilio Cortez; stock certificates and
investment records.
G) Any and all information concerning the subject
businesses stored in the form of magnetic or electronic coding
on computer or with the aid of computer-related equipment.

These

media include floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, removable hard
disk cartridges, tapes, laser disks, printer buffers, smart
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cards, memory calculators, electronic notebooks, and any other
media which is capable of storing magnetic coding.

Any and all

electronic devices which are capable of analyzing, creating,
displaying, converting or transmitting electronic or magnetic
computer impulses or data.

These devices include computers,

computer components, computer peripherals, word processing
equipment, modems, monitors, printers, plotters, encryption
circuit boards, optical scanners, external hard drives, and any
other computer related electronic devices.

Including operating

systems, application software, utility programs, compilers,
interpreters, and other programs or software used to communicate
with the computer hardware or peripherals either directly or
indirectly via telephone lines, radio, or other means of
transmission.
25.

Your affiant has probable cause to believe that

presently, or at the time of the execution of the search warrant
for which he is applying with this affidavit, there will be in
the aforementioned locations, property that constitutes evidence
of the commission of a criminal offense; contraband, the fruits
of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; property
20

designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the
means of committing a criminal offense.
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a search warrant be
issued for the seizure of the above-described items.
(X) During the daytime as there is reason to
believe it is necessary to seize the evidence prior
to its being concealed, altered or destroyed, or for
other good reasons, to wit: that RICHARD FRANKLIN
NORRIS and EMILIO CORTEZ, may become aware of this
investigation, and would at that time be in a
position to conceal, alter or destroy evidence of
criminal activities.

QLASL & —
RONALD BARTON, Affiant
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EXHIBIT "A" TO THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Documents relating to the business activities of RICHARD
FRANKLIN NORRIS and EMILIO CORTEZ, operating as MAXTRON CORP.
(formerly ALTA PUBLISHING) , SANTOS INTERNATIONAL, and UNITED
INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC.
These documents are more particularly described as follows:
A) Records in whatever form of contacts with customers
and clients of MAXTRON CORP (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING); SANTOS
INTERNATIONAL; and UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, I N C ,
including mailings, receipt of funds, and inquiries,
B) Banking records, accounting records, check registers,
deposit slips, money order receipts, receipts for cashiers
checks, cashiers checks, records of wire transfers in whatever
form showing the source and application of funds received from or
transferred to persons and/or entities.
C)
Records in whatever form relating to mailing and
receipt of parcels and packages whether U. S. Mail or other
common carrier.
D) Safes, indicia of safe deposit boxes, storage
facilities or similar devices used for storage of records or
belongings and applications for mail drop boxes.
E)
Promotional materials in whatever form showing the
information provided to customers and the initial solicitation,
including copies of promissory notes and/or advertising
contracts. Copies of any video and/or audio tapes.
F)
Copies of any and all general correspondence and
business records including: client statements; client
contracts and/or proposals; subcontract agreements and/or
contracts; materials describing company concepts; audio/visual
materials; invoices for the purchase of or services performed for
the editing, marketing, drafting or graphic design, printing
and/or binding of various publications; statements relating to
vendor accounts; canceled checks; bank statements; ledgers; books
of accounts; accounting and/or financial records detailing the
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daily business activity of the companies; personal diaries,
telephone logs; appointment books; checkbooks, information
pertaining to safe deposit boxes; records indicating the location
of assets; warehouse shipping and receiving records; commission
and payroll records; travel records; employee applications;
marketing scripts; all corporate books and records; documentation
of fictitious names used by company officers and employees;
mailing and/or shipping records for both public and private
carriers; lease agreements; employment contracts; partnership
agreements; any and all records which identify or pertain to
individuals having managerial or supervisory responsibility,
including, but not limited to, records pertaining to Richard
Franklin Norris and Emilio Cortez; stock certificates and
investment records.
G)
Any and all information concerning the subject
businesses stored in the form of magnetic or electronic coding
on computer or with the aid of computer-related equipment. These
media include floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, removable hard
disk cartridges, tapes, laser disks, printer buffers, smart
cards, memory calculators, electronic notebooks, and any other
media which is capable of storing magnetic coding. Any and all
electronic devices which are capable of analyzing, creating,
displaying, converting or transmitting electronic * or magnetic
computer impulses or data. These devices include computers,
computer components, computer peripherals, word processing
equipment, modems, monitors, printers, plotters, encryption
circuit boards, optical scanners, external hard drives, and any
other computer related electronic devices. Including operating
systems, application software, utility programs, compilers,
interpreters, and other programs or software used to communicate
with the computer hardware or peripherals either directly or
indirectly via telephone lines, radio, or other means of
transmission.
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Addendum C

Inventory of Items Seized Under -AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT- on 4/2/97
At: 3392 West 3500 South West Valley Cit UT
Case: Norris/Maxtron
By: Special Agent Ronald Barton, Utah Attorney General
Rm

Evki#

B

B

B

Pesciiption/LocationfoigKl

Quanity Make/RmDesciipt

Computrend Keyboaid
Southwest comer

Conputer/File Room

Mouse
Southwest comer

Computei/File Room

Power cord
Southwest comer

Computei/File Room

Computei/File Room

CPU
Southwest Comer

Computei/File Room

Box of business checks; Santos
wrest floor

Computei/File Room

Box of business checks; United
west floor

Conputei/File Room

Boxof business checks; Matron
west floor

Computer/File Room

Misc. File Folders
fife cabinet, east wall

Computer/File Room

Misc. File Folders
File Cabinet, East Wall

Computei/File Room

Payable Binders; Misc. files
desk; north wafl

Computei/File Room

Smith Corona, word keyboard
desk top, west wall

Computei/File Room

Function keys
desk top, west wall

Computei/File Room

14

CPU
desk top, west wall

PWP system 14
Computei/File Room

15

Monitor
Desk Top, west wall

Computei/File Room

Power cord
desk top, west wafl

Computei/File Room

B

10

11

12

13

16

Serial #

Sk8801B-lU

M910212675

95024850

Monitor
Southwest comer

B

Model

CM8428SX

10811529

015016

1TEB1113523

760245

1

75039686

Inventory of Items Seized Under -AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT- on 4/2/97
At: 3392 West 3500 South West Vafley Cit UT
Case: Norris/Maxtron
By: Special Agent Ronald Barton, Utah Attorney General
a

Evid#
17

Inscription/Location found

Quanity Make/RmDescript

1 - 3.5"floppydisk
Floppy drive, CPU

Computei/File Room

6-3.5" floppy disks
cabinet, south waD, west end

Computer/File Room

Misc. File Folders
Lateralfile;east waD

Computer/File Room

Misc. files; rolodex
desk area

Computer/File Room

Misc. documents
wastebasket

Computer/File Room

Ledger Sheets
Desk area

Computei/File Room

Cassette backup tape
desk

Computei/File Room

Binders; Account Records
Inside door, on floor

Norris Office

Bank Records; Reports; Binder, Misc.
Inside door, floor

Norris Office

Bank Records; Files,
Inside Door, floor

Norris Office

Court files; legal papers; civil suit fi
top of file cabinet b

Norris Office

Metal File Box
File drawer

Norris Office

6

Keyboard
Top of Desk

Keytronic
Norris Office

7

Mouse
Desk Top

A4Tech
Norris Office

8

Power cord
Desk Top

Norris Office

Monitor
DeskTop

Norris Office

18

19

20

21

22

23

1

2

3

4

5

9

Model

Serial*

E03601QL

J943618449

930464292

7134T

2

M134T247040

Inventory of Items Seized Under -AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT- on 4/2/97
At: 3392 West 3500 South West Valley Cit UT
Case: Norris/Maxtron
By: Special Agent Ronald Barton, Utah Attorney General
Rm

Evid#
10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Descrytion/Location found

Quanity Make/RmDescript

CPU
Desk Top

Nonis Office

Cassette Tape Backup
Plasticfilebox; north wall, lower

Nonis Office

Disk Holder, w/5.5" disks
Bookshelf, north wall

Nonis Office

Disk Holder w/5.5" diskettes
Bookshelf, north wall

Nonis Office

Cassette tape backup
Desk, center drawer

Nonis Office

4-3.5"floppydisks
bookshelf, north wall

Nonis Office

Corporate Seals
Floor

Nonis Office

Sales Binders, plastic file case
Bookcase

Nonis Office

Briefcase w/documents
Floor by desk

Nonis Office

3-3.5" floppy disks
desk top

Nonis Office

7 envelopes; misc. papers, tapes
bookshelves; desk drawer, cab. A

Nonis Office

Misc. File Folders
File Cabinet, 3rd drawer

Office

Misc. File Folders
File Cabinet, 3rd drawer

Office

Misc. files
desk

Office

Contractor Layouts
Shelves; south wall

Storage

Contractor Layouts
shelves

Storage
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Model

Serial #

Deskftx>386

4735AJ2B0250

Inventoiy of Items Seized Under -AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT- on 4/2/97
At: 3392 West 3500 South West Valley Cit UT
Case: Norris/Maxtron
By: Special Agent Ronald Barton, Utah Attorney General
m

Evid#
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Description/Location found Quanity Make/Rm Descript
contractor layouts
shelves

Storage

United Statements; checks; envel
Shelves, south wall

Storage

Advertising brochures;
shelves, south wall

Storage

advertising brochures
shelves, south wall

Storage

United stationery; agreements; sponsor
shelves; south wall

Storage

Advertising brochures
shelves, south wall

Storage

advertisin g brochures
shelves, south wall

Storage

advertising brochures
shelves, south wall

Storage

Misc. papers, contracts, etc
Trash, storage
room

Storage

4

Model

Serial #

wventoiy of Items Seized Under -AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT*- on 4/2/97
At: 4440 Christopberson Dr. U B West Valley Ck UT
C M * : NoiraMaxfron
By: Lt Ronald Barton. Attorney General

Rm Evid#

De5cnptioa^^

H

Conner Minicartridge Tape
Left tide of b«d hetdbottd

Master Bedroom

Conner Minicartridge Tape
Left side of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

31/2" tkppy disks
Left side of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

S

9

10

11

12

13
14

15
16

Quanity Make/Rm Descript

Oiecfa, check carbons, deposi receipt
. Left side of bed hcacftoard

Model
420QT

d20QT

Master Bedroom

Tckpboac/addrcss boofcs
Right side of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

M»oeIlancoiis papers
Right side of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

F2e &Uer * An*©* vs Richard Nora"
Right site of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

Fik&kl<shHSBbybck"
Right side of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

Fib Folder "Cobos, Vfctor*
Right eidg of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

Audio cassette
Right sile of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

Audio cassenc
Right side of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

Audio Cassette
Right side of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

Audio Cassette
Right side of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

Audio Cassette
Right aide of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

3 Ring binder, Uroe fatenutional
Right side of bed headboard

Master Bcdiooin

CA-BPI Accounting I software
Right side of bed headboard

Master Bedroom

1

SeraJff

Inventory of Items Seized Under -AUTHORTTY OF A WARRANT- on 4/2/97
At: 4440 ChristophcrsonDr. # B West VaSey Cff UT
Case: Noiris/Maxtron
By: Lt RonaJd Barton, Attorney General
to

Evid#
17

18

19

I

DescriptioQlxKatioQfound

Quaaty MakftRmDescript

Audio Cassette
€k>3ct

Master bedroom

Fin
Presecroh photos

Master Bedroom

Fife
Ptes earch photo s

Mas ter Bedroom

Miscellaneous papers
Wmdowsill

Kkchcn/Diaiag

2

Model

Seral#

xv^cui^dX!. U f

This

document

will

,UU<JUMENTS

acknowledge

that

on

this

date,

the

following described documents were released from the custody of the
Consumer Rights Division, Office of the Attorney General, pursuant
to request

of David

R.

Maddox,

counsel

for Richard Norris.

Said documents are described as:
a)

an envelope addressed to: Third District, Judge
Edward Watson, West Valley City Circuit Court,
3600 Constitution Blvd., West Valley City, UT

b)

an envelope addressed to: Mr. Elliot R. Lawrence,
West Valley City Attorney's Office, 3600
Constitution Blvd., West Valley City, UT

c)

an envelope addressed to: C. Danny Frazier,
Attorney for the Appellee-Defendant,
3 9 West 300 North, Provo, UT

d)

an envelope addressed to: Court Clerk, Utah
State Court of Appeals, 23 0 South 500 East,
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, UT

This will further acknowledge that documents a, b and c were
placed in the United States Mail and document d was delivered to
the Utah Court of Appeals.
Said

documents

having

been

seized

by

the

Utah

Attorney

General's Office on April 2, 1997, pursuant to Search Warrant dated
April 1, 1997, from the business location of Richard Norris, dba
Maxtron Corporation, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah.

DATED this 2T~day

of

, 1997.

[APT &XAP_ «=
CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Rights Division

RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

This document will acknowledge my receipt of the electronic
items described on Attachment *A" hereto, from the Utah Division of
Investigations and the Consumer Rights Division, Office of the
Attorney General,
Said items having been seized on April 2,

1331,

pursuant to

Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location o£
Richard F. Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah.
DATED this £fday of /7^£sU^r

, 1997.

^

^

(Signature)

(Printed Name)

WITNESS:

ATTACHMENT "A" TO STIPULATION/RECEIPT AS TO
RETURN OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
(Richard F.Norris)
Inventory
ISa,

Original
Equipment PcgcriPttoP.;

Description of
Duplicate Hard Privet

Bl

Computrend Keyboard

M910212675

B2

Mouse

95024850

B3

Powcrcord

—

134

Monitor

10811529

B5

CPU

015016

D14

CPU, PWP System 14

1TEB1113523

D15

Monitor

75039686

B16

Powercord

-

C6

Keytronic Keyboard

J943618449

C7

A-4 Tech Mouse

930464292

C8

Power Cord

—

C9

Monitor 7134T

M134T247040

CIO

CPU, DcskPro 386

4735AJ2B0250

RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE

This document will acknowledge my receipt of the following
original items, from the Consumer Rights Division, Office of the
Attorney General.
Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of
Richard Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah.

lis _^2
day of
of fy,fjLM*J'
jC/p^sS
DATED this
^ul day

-^signature

Printed Name

WITNESS :

^M-fL C'Ultfsc

, 1997

ATTACHMENT UA" TO RECEIPT FOR RETURN
OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE

Description:
1)

Box of Blank Checks: Santos International Inc., Pittsburgh
Home Savings Bank. No. 0101 thru' 03 00

2)

Box of Blank Checks: United Investors Credit Services, Inc.,
Zions Bank, Utah, Acct. No. 012-11518-4. No. 0201 thru' 0300

3)

Box of Blank Checks: United Investors Credit Services, Inc.,
Integra Bank, Pittsburgh, PA. No. 176 thru' 3 00

4)

Box of Blank Checks: Maxtron Corporation, Zions Bank, Utah,
Acct. No. 012-11519-2. No. 1076 thru' 1175

RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE
lis document will acknowledge my receipt of the following
al items, from the Consumer Rights Division, Office of the
*y General.
1 Box of computerized checks, Santos International,
Pittsburgh, PA - commencing with No. 01170
(Inventory No. B-6)
1 Box of computerized checks, United Investors
Credit Services, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA - commencing
With No. 01176 - (Inventory No. B-7)
1 Box of computerized checks, Maxtron Corporation,
Philadelphia, PA - commencing with No. 01252
(Inventory No. B-8)
1 Package of blank statement forms, United
Investors Credit Services, Inc.
1 Box Window Envelopes, United Investors
Credit Services, Inc. - (Inventory No. 1-6)
1 Package of blank "Contract Purchase Summary
Forms", United Investors; 1 Package of blank
"Sponsor's Publishing Agreement", Maxtron Corporation;
1 Package of blank Advertising Agreement" forms,
Maxtron Corporation; 1 Package of blank "Promissory Note"
forms, Maxtron Corporation; 1 Package of letterhead,
United Investor's Credit Services (Inventory No. 1-7)
id items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a
Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of
Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah.
TED this J^T

day of

^ / j ^ ^

, 1997.

Signature (Richard Norris)

L/UJL.

V6M

RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE

This document will acknowledge my receipt of the original
items identified on Attachment

"A", from the Consumer Rights

Division, Office of the Utah Attorney General.

Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of
Richard Norris, 33 92 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah.

DATED

this /6> day of

—-->-

^njj\

-

, 1997,

,_

Signature (Richard Norris)

WITNESS

Norris Publishing dba LaRoe v.
Utley, Kaye
Norris Publishing dba LaRoe v.
Coit, Darla
(BOX 2)
LaRoe International
(1) Plastic File Case
Containing Alphabetial
Files
(2) Package of individual (48)
account cards w/attachments
(3) Misc. File Folders:
Cobos, Victor
Hunter, Randy
Amtext vs. Richard Norris
Blaylock, Bill
Tueller, Doug
(4) Unlabeled folders containing:
Slesser, Douglas (3)
Norris vs. Elmer
Norris vs. Norton
Norris vs. Beardall (3)
Norris vs. Castillo (2)
(5) Empty Alphabetical folders,
A,D,G,I,J,L,N,Q,R,U,V,X,Y,Z
(6) 3-Ring, Red Binder, labeled
"LaRoe International Independent
Advisor Training Manual
(7) 2 Large File Folders;
G.A.P. (Great American Publishing)
and LaRoe International
(BOX 3 through 7)
Printed Materials, copies of miscellaneous advertising
brochures

RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

This document will acknowledge my receipt of the electronic
item described below from the Utah Division of Investigations and
the Consumer Rights Division, Office of the Attorney General.
Radio Shack Telephone Cassette Recorder
Model No. 43-273
Serial No. 103389 3A6
w/cords and power supply AC adapter, No. 9620
Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of
Richard F. Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah.

DATED this jj^ day of V / >L ^

, 1997

(Printed Name)

RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE

This document will acknowledge my receipt of the original
items identified on Attachment

"A", from the Consumer Rights

Division, Office of the Utah Attorney General.

Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of
Richard Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah.

DATED this

/£ day of

v ] ^ ^

, 1998

Signature (Richard Norris)

WITNESS

[^LAIC^

ATTACHMENT "A" to RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL EVIDENCE
(Richard Norris dba Maxtron)

Utah Tax CommigsJQn - Documents:
a)
b)

Coupon Book - Income Tax Withholding 1997 for Maxtron
Coupon Book - Income Tax Withholding 1997 for Great American
Publishing

Internal Revenue Service - Documents:
a)
b)
c)

Federal Tax Deposit Coupon Books
(1997) for: Norris
Publishing; Maxtron Corp; United Investors Credit Services;
Norris Publishing; Santos International
Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return form - Norris
Publishing
Schedule B - Employer's Record of Federal Tax Liability -

State of Pennsylvania - Documents:
a)

Business Privilege Tax Return - 1997 (United Investors)
w/instructions & envelopes

b)

Business Privilege Tax Return - 1997 (Santos)

c)

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Report Booklet, 1996

d)

Coupon Book - PA Department of Revenue - Bureau of Corporation
Taxes 1997 for Maxtron

e)

Coupon Book - PA Department of Revenue - Bureau of Corporation
Taxes 1997 for United Investors

f)

Coupon Book - Philadelphia Revenue Department - 1997 Quarterly
Wage Tax - Maxtron

g)

Mercantile Tax Return - Santos International - 1997 -

h)

Coupons (12) - 1997 - City of Pittsburgh, Occupation Tax
Return for Santos International and United Investors

REV-1200

PA

Corporation

Tax

Miscellaneous Documents:
a)

4 Marketing/Advertising Books - Anderson Homes (Shadow Acres]

RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE
This document will acknowledge my receipt of the following
listed original items, from the Consumer Rights Division, Office of
the Utah Attorney General:
Internal Revenue Service - Documents:
a)

Federal Tax Deposit Coupon Books
Publishing; Santos International

(1997)

for:

Norris

State of Utah Documents:
a)

Employer's Quarterly Wage List, Job Service,
Corporation.

for Maxtron

Miscellaneous Documents:
a)

Original Check #4262, from Salt Lake County Sheriff Service
Fee account, dated 3/6/97, in the amount of $27.00.

b)

Original Check #4332, from Salt Lake County Sheriff Service
Fee Account, dated 3/26/97, in the amount of $15.00, attached
to Weber County Small Claims Affidavit and Order, with Sheriff
return of service.

c)

3 legal size pressboard binders, containing copies
unnumbered blank stock certificates for the State of
Pennsylvania

d)

1 (8.5" x 11") brown leather folder, no contents

e)

1 5.25" SKC diskette labeled "V 8.00 Diags
Setup)"

of

(Test Insert &

Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of
Richard Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah.
DATED this

day of

&4AsAtM^~~)y

^

y,, 1998.

Signature^XRicharcl "Norris)
WITNESS:

<2mcA

OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONSUMER RIGHTS DIVISION
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE

This document will acknowledge my receipt of the original
items identified on Attachment

"A", from the Consumer Rights

Division, Office of the Utah Attorney General.

Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of
Richard Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah.

i./Z*£day of

DATED thi

2kJL_.

Signature

WITNE

1998

Norris)

ATTACHMENT "A" to RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL EVIDENCE
(Richard Norris dba Maxtron)
Briefcase containing:
pocket calculator; business card file; recorder and microphone
(Evidence C-18)
Telephone Address Book (Evidence H-5)
Diary Planner
Month-at-a-Glance (Academic/Fiscal Planner 1996-97)
Box with miscellaneous advertising/marketing brochures
Box with miscellaneous advertising/marketing brochures
Box containing:
* 36 file folders labeled Norris Box 10 containing
miscellaneous documents
* 4 file folders labeled Norris Box 15 containing
miscellaneous documents
* 7 file folders labeled Norris Box 12 containing
miscellaneous documents
* 3 file folders labeled Norris Box 19 containing
miscellaneous documents
* 1 file folder labeled Norris Box 5 containing
miscellaneous documents
* 4 file folders labeled Norris Box 7 containing
miscellaneous documents
* 1 file folder labeled Norris Box 8 containing
miscellaneous documents
* 1 file folder labeled Norris Box 16 containing
miscellaneous documents
* 3 file folders labeled Norris Box 33 containing
miscellaneous documents.
* 2 file folders labeled Norris Box 14 containing
miscellaneous documents
* 1 file folder labeled Norris Box 23 containing
miscellaneous documents
Box containing:
* Legal Size Expanding File folder containing miscellaneous
documents
* Red hanging folder labeled Miscellaneous
* file folder labeled Mastercard
* file folder labeled Richard Norris (Quintana)
* file folder labeled Rick's Personal 1997 bank statements
* Yellow handing folder labeled Maxtron Corporate Records
* file folder labeled State Sales Tax - Misc.
* file folder labeled 1997 Payroll Reports
* file folder labeled Ricks Personal Checking
* file folder labeled Santos: A/P to be Paid
* file folder labeled Maxtron: A/P to be Paid
* file folder labeled United: A/P to be Paid
* file folder labeled UPS
* file folder (orange) labeled Work 12-94 - Jan. 97
* file folders (7) unlabeled containing miscellaneous docs.

Plastic envelope labeled "Room C on Floor by Desk 5c Bookcases"
containing file folder labeled Norris A/P to be paid;
envelope from City of Philadelphia
1 Expanding file folder, not labeled; containing
various invoices
1 Large envelope labeled Norris Box 3, "Brinkerhoff"
1 Large envelope labeled "Visitors G.D."
)

1
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Box miscellaneous items:
card index file
misc. index cards ( 3 x 5 )
envelope containing (9) small spiral notebooks
3 corporate seals
rolodex file
duplicate audio tapes (8)
5 writing instruments
cancelled checks
checkbooks
deposit slips

)

(Ten) Kinkos boxes of copies of documents, the originals of
which have been retained by AG's office.

Addendum D

hourth Judicial Districf'cbuW
of Utah County, State of Utah
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk

fi Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NUMBER: 981403794

Plaintiff,
DATED: MARCH 31, 2000
vs.
RULING ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
RICHARD F. NORRIS,
Defendant.

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

This case is before the court on defendant's motion to suppress all evidence seized
pursuant to a search warrant issued on April 1, 1997, by Third District Judge Sheila K
McCleve, sitting as magistrate. After I heard the evidence at a two-day preliminary
hearing in May 1999,1 bound the matter over for trial. Thereafter this case was assigned
to the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Fourth District Court Judge.1
1

It now is set for a multi-

There is in the file a notice of reassignment-recusal. Some further explanation as to this
document is appropriate. From January 1998 to July 1999 I was assigned under the 4th District
division plan to the criminal division of the court and this case was assigned to me. After hearing
the preliminary hearing I found probable cause and bound the matter over for trial. As I was
scheduled shortly to rotate out of the criminal division and Judge Ray M. Harding was scheduled to
replace me in the criminal division, and because David Sturgill, defendant's appointed counsel, had
recently concluded a term as law clerk/bailiff for Judge Harding, in accordance with a policy of the
4th District Court which requires judges to recuse in cases in which recent, former law clerks have
appeared as counsel, it was agreed that I would enter an order recusing Judge Hardingfromthis
case and making an assignment to another judge in the criminal division. I did so. While the
reassignment-recusal implies that grounds exist for my recusal in this case, that is not accurate.
Rather, Judge Harding, to whom this case would have passed under the 4th District division plan,
did. I entered the recusal assigning the case awayfromhim and to Judge Eyre.
1

day jury trial to begin April 10, 2000. With that trial date looming, and Judge Eyre having
blocked out several days for the trial, defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the search,
asserting defects with the warrant and the underlying affidavit. At the suggestion, and
upon the stipulation of the parties, ostensibly because they believed my familiarity with the
case would allow for a quick ruling on the motion to suppress, the case was assigned to
me by Judge Eyre in his capacity as presiding judge of the 4th District. I therefore will rule
on the motion to suppress and return the case to Judge Eyre.
1 have carefully reviewed the memoranda of the parties, the affidavit executed
upon application for the search warrant, the search warrant issued by the magistrate and
controlling case law. I now issue this ruling granting the motion to suppress.
Factual Setting
The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute. On April 1, 1997, Ronald
Barton, a Special Agent for the Utah Attorney General's Office, Consumer Rights
Division, a trained peace officer, appeared before the magistrate seeking issuance of a
search warrant. Barton executed his affidavit in front of the magistrate and the magistrate
issued a warrant.2 The warrant describes two premises to be searched, a residence (site
#1) and a business (site #2). The warrant directed search for:
Documents relating to the business activities of RICHARD FRANKLIN
NORRIS AND EMILIO CORTEZ, operating as MAXTRON CORP.
(formerly ALTA PUBLISHING), SANTOS INTERNATIONAL, and
UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC.

2

While the warrant and affidavit were not entered as evidence at the hearing, each side
provided the court with a copy of the warrant and affidavit. Thankfully they were the same. So
that the record may be complete, I have attached to the original of this ruling one of those copies
together with the return on the warrant.
2

The warrant then noted that "[t]hese documents and computerfilesare more fully
described on Exhibit 'A' attached hereto." A two page exhibit "A" was attachecj^vhich
identified seven categories of documents and things to search for. Finally, the warrant
provided conclusory findings:
[T]hat the above described property or evidence;
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense;
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing
or concealing a public offense;
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed
by a party to the illegal conduct.
The warrant directed a search "of the above-described premises for the above-described
property or evidence
From the returns on the warrant it is clear a search took place. Computers and
many, manyfileswere taken. Over a period of more than two months some of the
materials were returned.
Analysis and Ruling
Defendant raisesfiveobjections to the warrant. As to four of these, I am not
persuaded, and deny suppression on each of those four grounds. As to thefifth,however,
defendant is correct in his analysis. The warrant is over broad.
The warrant is over broad.
The starting point for an analysis is the Fourth Amendment. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the

persons or things to be seized . . . .
If this amendment means anything, it is that a warrant must describe with
particularity items to be seized by an executing officer. The Supreme Court has
"recognize[d] that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant authorizing a
search and seizure of a person's papers . . . . Responsible officials, including judicial
officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that minimizes
unwarranted intrusions on privacy." Andresen v. Maryland, All U.S. 463, 482, n. 11
(1976). As citizens of this country, each of us is vested with a right to be secure from
unwarranted intrusions on our privacy The ability of government officials to rummage
unfettered through a person's private papers is one aspect of the evils against which the
Fourth Amendment sought to protect. It did so by requiring that a warrant particularly
describe the items for which the executing officers may search. This requirement was
succinctly stated by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 602 (10th
Cir. 1988):
As an irreducible minimum, a proper warrant must allow the executing
officers to distinguish between items that may and may not be seized.
This does not express a principle. The Fourth Amendment expresses a right: the
right of each citizen to be secure from unwarranted governmental intrusions into our
private affairs. In this case the warrant did not square with that right. Rather, it was over
broad-way over broad. Let me explain.
In this case the warrant directed search of both the business premises and the home
of defendant. Through the attached Exhibit "A", the warrant identified seven categories
of items to be searched for and seized. In defense of the warrant, the State claims that the
4

warrant cannot be over broad because it authorized search for specifically identified items
and records. It also claims that the warrant cannot be over broad as it only allowed search
for business records, not the personal records of Norris. In a sense the State is right on
both of these points. Yet, in making these arguments the State is missing the forest for the
trees.
The warrant is over broad, not because it failed to identify specific items or classes
of documents and records to be searched for, but because these classes of records are so
broad, so all encompassing, that there was nothing in the business records of Norris,
Maxtron, Santos or United which was not subject to search and seizure. A review of the
attached Exhibit "A" bears this out.
Paragraph A.
Paragraph A of the exhibit directs search for "[rjecords in whatever form of
contacts with customers and clients of Maxtron . . . Santos . . . and United . . . ." This is
a broad description permitting the State to look at every record of Norris, Maxtron,
Santos and United pertaining to any business with their customers and clients. Applied in
the context of the affidavit, and given the nature of the communications fraud set forth in
the affidavit, it may not be too broad.3 But, when viewed in conjunction with the
extremely broad authority described hereafter, it is clear that the cumulative is just too

3

It is true that in alluding to the affidavit, I gloss over the issue of whether the affidavit
may properly be considered, which raises the issue of whether the affidavit was properly
incorporated by reference, a whole other issue. Given the result hereafter, I need not resolve this
point.
5

great.4
Paragraph B.
Paragraph B directs search for "[b]anking records, accounting records, check
registers, deposit slips, money order receipts, receipts for cashiers checks, cashiers checks,
records of wire transfers in whatever form showing the source and application of funds
received from or transferred to persons and/or entities." This also is a broad description
permitting the State to look at every single business banking or accounting record of
Norris, Maxtron, Santos or United. Even though the affidavit describes a rather pervasive
scheme, as with the authority set forth in paragraph A, when the direction in paragraph B
is read in conjunction with the other authority described hereafter, this authorization is too
broad.
Paragraph C.
Paragraph C directs search for u[r]ecords in whatever form relating to mailing and
receipt of parcels and packages whether U.S. Mail or other common carrier." This is a
broad description permitting a review of all of the incoming and outgoing mail of Norris,
Maxtron, Santos or United. Even though they used the mail for much of their scheme,
authority to search the incoming and outgoing mail and mail logs should have been much
more narrowly drawn, so that only the records clearly relating to the scheme would have
been subject to the search.

4

One may ask how an officer, seeking a warrant for the search and seizure of business
records, should draft the warrant so that it will be appropriately narrow and limited, truly a hard
question. But, in issuing this ruling I need not answer that question if the search authority is
patently too broad, as I find it to be.
6

Paragraph F.
Paragraph F5 directs search for "[c]opies of any and all general correspondence
and business records including . . .." (Emphasis added.) Needless to say, this search
authorization is broad, tremendously broad. On its face it commands search for and
seizure of every business record in the possession of Norris, Maxtron, Santos or United.
Taken literally, this paragraph directs the executing officers to back a truck up to the door
and take every business record or file having to do with Norris, Maxtron, Santos or
United.
If, as defendant claims, this paragraph does not permit the proverbial fishing
expedition for incriminating records, it is difficult to conceive of a provision which would.
On its face, this paragraph directs search for and seizure of all business records. There is
no limitation, no restriction.
In a clarifying phrase the paragraph authorized search for and seizure of such
patently irrelevant records as personal diaries, payroll records and employee applications.
Arguably other records identified also are entirely irrelevant, such as lease agreements,
employment contracts, travel records and partnership agreements. Standing alone, this
paragraph, having no limitation as to which business records could be searched for or
seized, is over broad. When read in conjunction with the very broad authorizations set
forth in paragraphs A, B and C, the warrant crosses the line from constitutionality to
unconstitutionality. It is altogether too broad.
Paragraph G.

5

I do notfindeither Paragraph D or E over broad and thus do not discuss them here.
7

Finally, paragraph G permitted in broad brush fashion search for u[a]ny and all
information concerning the subject business stored in the form of magnetic or electronic
coding on computer or with the aid of computer-related equipment. . . ." This is a broad
invitation to search for and seize any and all business records and files stored on
computer.6 By this the State was given carte blanche to review every single computer
record or file of Norris, Maxtron, Santos or United. This authorization is over broad.
In so many ways this case is like Leary. And the reasoning there fits well into the
factual circumstances of this case. In discussing the particularity requirement, the Leary
court noted:
The fourth amendment requires that warrants "particularly
describ[e]... the persons or things to be seized. . . . This requirement
prevents a "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings," . . .
and "'makes general searches . . . impossible and prevents the seizure of
one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.'" . . .
"The particularity requirement [also] ensures that a search is confined in
scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for
which there is demonstrated probable cause."
The test applied to the description of the items to be seized is a
practical one. "c A description is sufficiently particular when it enables the
searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be
seized.'" . . . Even a warrant that describes the items to be seized in broad
or generic terms may be valid "when the description is as specific as the
circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit." ...
However, the fourth amendment requires that the government describe the
items to be seized with as much specificity as the government's knowledge
and circumstances allow, and "warrants are conclusively invalidated by
their substantial failure to specify as nearly as possible the distinguishing

6

In fact it appearsfromthe documents attached to the warrant and affidavit that in fact
the officers seized the computersfromthe business establishment. I also note, parenthetically, that
the returns also make clear, as defendant complained in his motion, that the officers seized records
having to do with a business not identified in the affidavit, LaRoe International.
8

characteristics of the goods to be seized."
Leary, 846 F.2d at 600, all citations omitted.
In Leary the court found the warrant invalid because the warrant contained only
two limitations on the search:
First, the documents to be seized had to fall within a long list of business
records typical of the documents kept by an export company. Second,
those documents had to relate to "the purchase, sale and illegal exportation
of materials in violation of the" federal export laws. In this context-the
search of the offices of an export company-these limitations provide no
limitation at all. The warrant authorizes, and the customs agents
conducted, a general search of the Kleinberg offices.
Leary, 846F.2dat 600-01.
This case is no different. The warrant authorized the search of all of the business
correspondence and business records of Norris, Maxtron, Santos and United and all of
their business computer files and records, a general, rummaging search. As well, it
authorized search of all of their business banking and accounting records and all of their
business incoming and outgoing mail records. There was no limitation imposed by the
warrant on the authority of the executing officers to dig through every last business
document at the office and at Norris' home and to seize all of them.
This case also is closely analogous to Voss v. Bergsgaard, 11A F.2d 402, 404 (10th
Cir. 1985). There the Tenth Circuit found the warrant over broad with this explanation:
The particularity requirement ensures that a search is confined in
scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for
which there is demonstrated probable cause. The government affidavit
supporting the warrants at issue alleged a scheme of tax fraud, and the
district court found that probable cause existed. The bulk of the warrant
was not restricted to evidence relating to tax fraud, however. It authorized
government agents to rummage through all of the [defendant business']
customer files, bank records, employee records, precious metal records,
9

marketing and promotional literature, and more, seeking any information
pertaining to any federal crime.
Other than as noted in the very last phrase, which clarifies that in Voss the warrant
allowed search for any information pertaining to any federal cnme, what the warrant in
Voss allowed, and what this warrant also allows, was a general rummaging through all of
the business records of Norris, Maxtron, Santos and United. There simply was no
restriction nor limitation. The scope of the permitted search in this case was not
reasonably related to uncovering evidence of a particular crime, but was the most glorious
kind offishingexpedition-a charter off the Mexican Baja marlinfishing-seekingsome
evidence of communications fraud. The warrant in this case is over broad. It must be
stricken and any evidence obtained by the search suppressed.
The warrant does not state a charge.
I accept the State's analysis and conclude that applicable law does not require that
the warrant, standing alone, state the charge for which the search is authorized. The
affidavit set forth with sufficient particularity the nature of the scheme of communications
fraud. I deny suppression on this ground.
The warrant includes non-party business records.
While it may be, as defendant alleges, that the search resulted in the seizure of
business records having to do with entities other than the target entities described in the
affidavit, at the most, this is just a further extension of the argument that the warrant was
over broad. I do notfindthat this ground provides a separate basis for suppression, and
deny suppression on this ground.
The officer used expunged information in obtaining the warrant.
10

I do not accept defendant's analysis that the officer relied upon expunged
information in obtaining the warrant and deny suppression on this ground.
The review by the magistrate of the affidavit and warrant was inadequate*
This last argument is that the magistrate erred in concluding that the affidavit
established probable cause. I disagree. As in Voss, any fair reading of the affidavit leads
to the conclusion that the officer described a pattern of conduct between Norris, Maxtron,
Santos and United which worked afraudon many individuals. That pattern was explained
in sufficient detail and precision that a magistrate wouldfindprobable cause that Norris
and his companies were engaged in a scheme or pattern of criminal fraud and that the
fraudfitwithin the statutory proscription of communication fraud. Ifindthat the afiBdavit
provided probable cause that criminal activity was afoot. I deny suppression on this
ground.
Conclusion.
The warrant was over broad. I grant the motion to suppress on that ground but
deny the motion on all other grounds raised by defendant. The evidence seized in the
search must be suppressed. Defendant's counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate
order.
Dated this JI day of March, 2000.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this fl\ day of March, 2000:
Dave Sturgill
Paul DeWitt
Hand Delivered
Neil Gunnarson
5272 S College Drive #302
Murray, Utah 84123
CARMABUSH .
CLERICOF THE COURT
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Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
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Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Administrative finding" means a decision upon a question of fact
reached by an administrative agency following an administrative hearing or
other procedure satisfying the requirements of due process.
(2) "Certificate of eligibility" means a document issued by the division
stating that the criminal record which is the subject of a petition for
expungement is eligible for expungement.
(3) "Conviction" means judgment by a criminal court on a verdict or finding
of guilty after trial, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere.
(4) "Division" means the Criminal Investigations and Technical Services
Division of the Department of Public Safety established in Section 53-10103.
(5) "Expungement" means the sealing or destruction of a criminal record,
including records of the investigation, arrest, detention, or conviction of
the petitioner.
(6) "Jurisdiction" means an area of authority.
(7) "Petitioner" means a person seeking expungement under this chapter.
(8) Second degree forcible felony includes:
(a) aggravated assault, if the person intentionally causes serious bodily
injury;
(b) aggravated assault by a prisoner;
(c) aggravated assault on school premises;
(d) intentional child abuse;
(e) criminally negligent automobile homicide;
(f) reckless child abuse homicide;
(g) mayhem;
(h) manslaughter;
(i) kidnaping;
(j) forcible sexual abuse;
Copr. ® West 2 001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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T
(k) robbery;
(1) felony fleeing causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(m) delivery of an explosive to a common carrier.
DIT
tory: C. 1953, 77-18-9, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 143, § 1; 1998, ch. 170, §
1998, ch. 263, § 59; 1999, ch. 21, § 101.
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